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IN THE SUPREME COTJRT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff-Respondent,

-v-

Case Nos. 18235 & 18236

ROBERT JORDA.""l, JR. , and
TERRY FULLMER,
Defendants-Appellants.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT

STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
The appellants were tried and found guilty of violating
Utah Code Ann.,§ 76-10-1206.5 (1953), as amended, which provides:
(1) A person is guilty of sexual exploitation of a
minor who knowingly employs, uses, persuades,
induces, entices or coerces any minor to pose in the
nude for the purpose of sexual arousal of any person
or for profit or to engage in any sexual or
simulated sexual conduct for the purpose of photographing, filming, recording or displaying in any
way the sexual or simulated sexual conduct.
(2) Any person who photographs, films, or records,
in any way minors in the nude for the purpose of
sexual arousal of any person or for profit or
engaged in any sexual or simulated sexual conduct is
guilty of sexual exploitation of a minor.
(3) Any person who displays, distributes, possesses
for the purpose of distributing, or sells material
depicting minors in the nude or engaging in sexual
or simulated sexual conduct is guilty of sexual
exploitation of minors.
(4) It is not a defense to this section that the
person who is charged with sexual exploitation of a
minor is parent, legal guardian or other person
exercising legal control of the child who was the
subject of the exploitation.
(5) A violation of this section is a felony of the
second degree.
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Under Utah Code Ann., § 76-10-1201(6)

(1953), as

am e na ea , " nu a i t y n is t hu s de f in ea :
(6) "Nudity" means the showing of the human male or
female genitals, pubic area, or buttocks, with less
than an opaque covering, or the showing of a female
breast with less than an opaque covering, or any
portion thereof below the top of the nipple, or the
depiction of covered male genitals in a discernably
turgid state.
"Sexual conduct" is defined in Utah Code Ann.,
§

7 6- l 0-12 0 1 ( 7 ) :

(7) "Sexual conduct" means acts of masturbation,
sexual intercourse, or any touching of a person's
clothed or unclothed genitals, pubic area, buttocks,
or, if the person is a female, breast, whether alone
or between members of the same or opposite sex or
between humans and animals in an act of apparent or
actual sexual stimulation or gratification.
From the guilty verdict, rendered in the Fourth Judicial District
Court in and for Utah County, by Judge J. Robert Bullock, on
December 14, 1981, the appellants appeal.
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
The appellants were tried on December 9, 1981, in a
bench trial before J. Robert Bullock, Judge of the Fourth Judicial
District Court of Utah,

in and for Utah County.

The appellants

were found guilty, and both were sentenced to the Utah State
Prison for a period not to exceed five years and fined $250.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
The respondent seeks an affirmance of the convictions.

-2-
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STATEMENT OF FACTS
On November 3, 1981, Officer J. Stewart Winn of the Orem
Police Department applied for a search warrant for 754 south 50
East, Orem, Utah,

to search for snapshots indicative of the sexual

exploitation of a minor.

In the affidavit for the search warrant

(Appendix "A"), Officer Winn stated that he had received
information from a confidential informant that a quantity of nude
photographs which pictured Holly Wilkerson, a minor, and Robert
Jordan and Terry Fullmer "engaging in or simulating sex acts" (R.
4).1

The search warrant issued by Judge Sumsion (Appendix "B")

authorized the search during the daylight hours of the appellants'
residence, "for the presence therein of child pornography and
other evidence of sexual exploitation of a minor" (R. 6).

The

premises were searched on November 3, 1981 (R. 81), and various
items were seized,

including, according to the inventory of

property taken from the residence (Appendix "C"), assorted instant
photographs, unexposed 33-mm. film,

flash cubes, a cloth sack,

unexposed Polaroid film and a General Electric color television
set (R. 5).

Approximately 225 photographs were seized (R. 82), of

which approximately 30 pictured Holly Wilkerson (see Exhibits
1-30).

On November 4, 1981, a criminal information was filed
against the appellants (Appendix "D"), charging them with the
violation of Utah Code Ann., § 76-10-1206.5 (1953), as amended,

lReferences to the trial record will be designated as

R.
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sexual exploitation of a minor:
. . in that they, at the time and place aforesaid,
knowingly and intentionally used, persuaded, induced
or enticed Holly Wilkerson, a minor, to pose in the
nude while simulating sexual conduct for the purpose
of photographing, filming, recording, or displaying
sexual or simulating sexual conduct.
(R.

2).
On November 9, 1981, Jordan filed a Notice of Claim that

the materials seized under the search warrant were not
pornographic (R. 7).

A hearing on whether the materials seized

were pornographic was not held.
Appellants moved to suppress the evidence seized on the
ground that the affidavit upon which the warrant was issued was
defective in that it set forth hearsay allegations of a police
informant, contained misrepresentations concerning the materials
set out to be seized, and failed to comply with the requirements
of Utah Code Ann., § 76-10-1212(1)

(1953), as amended,

materials were attached to the affidavit.

in that no

The motions further

asserted that the requirements of Utah Code Ann.,§ 76-10-1212(3)
(1953), as amended, were not followed in that the magistrate
failed to hold a hearing within seven days of the Notice alleging
the materials not to be pornographic, that in executing the
warrant,

the police officers exceeded the bounds of the warrant by

seizing materials which were outside the scope of the warrant, and
that the warrant did not specify with sufficient particularity the
items to be seized (R. 15, 24-25).
A hearing to suppress evidence was held December 7,
1981, wherein the above arguments were made by appellants and were
rejected by the court (R.

72-110).
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On December 9, 19 81, the appellants were tried without a
jury by J. Robert Bullock.

At trial, 30 of the photographs seized

under the warrant were introduced into evioence over the
appellants' objections (R. 128, Exhibits 1-30).

The evidence

indicated that the photographs were taken by Robert Jordan and
were posed at his direction on approximately September 15, 1981
(R.

123-127).
Although conflicting evidence arose as to whether the

appellants were aware that Holly Wilkerson was only 14 years of
age at the time the photographs were taken (R. 134-136, 143-144),
the trial court specifically found beyond a reasonable doubt that
the defendants did know, primarily upon the testimony of Mrs.
Wilkerson (Holly's mother), that both appellants knew that Holly
Wilkerson was a minor at the time the photographs were taken (R.

49).
Despite the appellants' contentions that the court made
no ruling on whether the photographs contained "simulated sex
acts," and that no actual sex acts took place on the date the
photographs were taken, the trial court found the appellants
guilty of knowingly and intentionally using, persuading, inducing
or enticing Holly Wilkerson to pose in the nude for the purpose of
photographing, filming, recording, or displaying sexual or
simulating sexual conduct, according to the charge in the
information (R. 49).
The appellants were each sentenced to a term not to
exceed five years at the Utah State Prison and to pay a fine of
$250.00.
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ARGUMENT
POINT I
SINCE THERE ARE NO SPEECH OR EXPRESSION
ACTIVITIES INVOLVED IN THE ACT OF SEXUAL
EXPLOITATION OF A MINOR, A FIRST AMENDMENT
ANALYSIS IS INAPPLICABLE IN THE INSTANT CASE~
Although the appellants have characterized this case as
one in which First Amendment issues abound, the respondent submits
that since there are no speech or expression issues involved in
the act of sexual exploitation of a minor, the appellants have no
standing to raise First Amendment arguments.
The recent United States Supreme Court case of New York
v. Ferber,

U.S.

, 31 Cr.L.R. 3139 (1982)

(Appendix "E"),

has lain to rest most of the issues raised by the appellants.

Up

until the time of the Ferber decision, the issue of what
protection, if any, was to be afforded the production and
distribution of "child pornography" had not been uniformly decided
throughout the country.

Many courts had treated the issues of

production and distribution of child pornography within the
context of the First Amendment.

Others had seen issues of

privacy, police protection of health, safety, and morals, or the
power of the state to regulate minors.

Indeed, some courts,

including the court from which the Ferber case was appealed, found
as controlling many issues raised by the appellants in this case.
The confusion and lack of uniformity between the federal districts
and among state courts was resolved by the landmark decision in
Ferber,

in which the United States Supreme Court specifically held

that the distribution of child

porn~raphy

was not protected under
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the First Arnenament and expressly recognized that the production
of such was also unprotected.2
Ferber arose when the proprietor of a Manhattan, New
York bookstore sold to an undercover police officer two films
depicting young boys masturbating.

He was indicted under the New

York laws controlling the dissemination of child pornography and
found guilty.
The New York statute provides:·
A person is guilty of the use of a child in a sexual
performance if knowing the character and content
thereof he employs, authorizes, or induces a child
less than 16 years of age to engage in a sexual
performance or being a parent, legal guardian or
custodian of such child, he consents to the
participation by such child in a sexual performance.
A "sexual performance"

is defined as:

Any performance or part thereof which includes
sexual conduct by a child less than 16 years of age.
"Sexual conduct" is in turn defined as:
Actual or simulated sexual intercourse, deviate
sexual intercourse, sexual bestiality, masturbation,
sado-masochistic abuse, or lewd exhibition of the
genitals.

31 Cr.L.R. at 3140.
2Thus, the decisions cited as controlling by the
appellants--Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1972), Ginsberg v.
New York, 390 U.S. 629 (1968), Interstate Circuit, Inc. v. City
of Dallas, 390 U.S. 676 (1968), Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville,
402 U.S. 205 (1975), Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557 (1969),
People v. Ferber, 52 N.Y.2d 674, 439 N.Y.S.2d 863 (1981), Graham
v. Hill, 444 F.Supp. 584 (W.D. Tex. 1978), People v. Kahan, 15
N.Y.2d 311, 258 N.Y.S.2d 391 (1965), St. Martin's Press, Inc. v.
Carey, 440 F.Supp. 1196 (S.D.N.Y. 1977), Horne Box Office, Inc. v.
Wilkinson, Civil No. C 81-0331J (C.D. Utah 1982)--are rendered
inapplicable to the extent that they contravene the holding in
Ferber.
Ferber, being dispositive of the child pornography issue,
must control.
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After a series of appeals, the decision of the latest of
which is referred to as controlling by the appellants, the Court
granted New York State's petition for certiorari to definitively

"

decide the following question:
To prevent the abuse of children who are made to
engage in sexual conduct for commercial purposes,
could the New York State Legislature, consistent
with the First Amendment, prohibit the dissemination
of material which shows children engaged in sexual
conduct, regardless of whether such material is
obscene?
31 Cr.L.R. at 3141.
In upholding Ferber's conviction, the Court set out five
specific reasons behind the holding that states are entitled to
far greater leeway in the regulation of pornographic depictions of
children than in the regulation of other materials.

(These five

reasons are set out in detail and analyzed within the context of
this case in Point III of this brief.)

In finding that child

pornography is a special class of material, the distribution of
which is not protected under traditional First Amendment rights,
the Ferber court specifically rejected the test set out in Miller
v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1972), for determining whether a
sexual depiction of a child is obscene.
While Ferber dealt specifically with the protections to
be given distribution of child pornography,

the case at bar

involves the production of child pornography, which is at least
one step removed from distribution.

However,

in Ferber, the Court

recognized that the production of child pornography is "an
activity illegal throughout the nation."

31 Cr.L.R. at 3143.
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After noting that "the federal government and fortyseven states have sought to combat the problem with statutes
specifically directed at the production of child pornography," (31
Cr.L.R. at 3140, citing specifically the Utah statute in question
in the instant case--see fn. 1, Id., at 3140), the Court, quoting
Gibboney v. Empire Storage and Ice Company, 336 U.S. 490 (1949),
stated:
It rarely has been suggested that
constitutional freedom for speech
extends its immunity to speech or
as an integral part of conduct in
a valid criminal statute.
31 Cr.L.R. at 3143.

the
and press
writing used
violation of

The Court implicitly recognized the

constitutionality of statutes which prohibit the production of
child pornography.

The Ferber court found that because the

distribution of child pornography was an integral part of the
production of child pornography, proscribed by law throughout the
nation, "and the constitutionality of these laws have not been
questioned" (31 Cr.L.R. at 3143), any First Amendment protections
given the distribution of pornography would be outweighed by the
State's interest in enforcing its constitutional laws.

The Court

found no First Amendment protection in the production of child
pornography or sexual exploitation of children.
The valid legislative purpose in passing child
pornography laws is the protection of children and youth from
sexual exploitation and abuse.

See 31 Cr.L.R. at 3142.

This

legislative purpose has been recognized by the appellant (see
Appellants' Brief at page 5).

The production of child
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pornography is directly related to the sexual exploitation and
abuse of children which the child pornography statutes, including
Utah Code Ann., § 76-10-1206.5, are designed to proscribe.

There

are, however, no speech or expression activities involved in
employing, using, persuading, inducing, enticing, or coercing a
minor to pose in the nude for the purpose of sexual arousal or for
profit, or to engage in sexual or simulated sexual conduct any
more than there are speech or expression activities involved in
rape, robbery, or murder.

Thus, the appellants' assertions

notwithstanding, in dealing with the production of child
pornography, a First Amendment expression analysis is inapposi te.
Whether the material resulting from exploitation and/or abuse of a
minor has value which would be otherwise protected under the First
Amendment or not is a secondary consideration, if a consideration
at all, to the State's interest in prohibiting exploitation and
abuse of minors in the first place, for whatever reason.

Thus,

the cases cited by the appellants regarding the right of the
public, even children, to view material protected under the
decisions enunciated in Miller v. California; Ginsberg v. New
York, 390 U.S. 629 (1968); Interstate Circuit, Inc., v. City of
Dallas, 390 U.S. 676 (1968); and Erznoznik v. City of
Jacksonville, 4022 U.S. 205 (1975), are inapplicable.

Those cases

dealt with the invalidity of statutes designed to keep children
from exposure to nudity,

ideas, and other material which would, in

the context of adult viewing, be entitled to First Amendment
protections.

Those cases did not deal with the exploitation

and/or abuse of children in the production of child pornography.
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In recognizing that the standard First Amendment Miller analysis
is inadequate in treating the problem of the sexual abuse and
exploitation of children through child pornography, the Ferber
court stated:
The Miller standard, like all general definitions of
what may be banned as obscene, does not reflect the
State's particular and more compelling interest in
prosecuting those who promote the sexual
exploitation of children.
Thus, the question under
the Miller test of whether a work, taken as a whole,
appeals to the prurient interest of the average
person bears no connection to the issue of whether a
child has been physically or psychologically harmed
in the production of the work.
Similarly, a
sexually explicit depiction need not be "patently
offensive" in order to have required the sexual
exploitation of a child for its production.
In
addition, a work which, taken on the whole, contains
serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific
value may nevertheless embody the hardest core of
child pornography.
"It is irrelevant· to the child
[who has been abused] whether or not the material
. . . has a literary, artistic, political, or social
value." Memorandum of Assemblyman Lasher in Support
of § 263.15.
We therefore cannot conclude that the
Miller standard is a satisfactory solution to the
child pornography problem.
31 Cr.L.R. at 3143.
Nor are the cases of Tinker v. Des Moines School
District, 393 U.S. 503 (1969); Gambino v. Fairfax Countv School
Board, 564 F.2d 157 (4th Cir. 1977); or Shanlev v. Northeast
Independent School District of Bexar County, Texas, 462 F.2d 960
(5th Cir. 1972), applicable to the case at hand.

Those cases,

which involved the expression of ideas through wearing armbands,
publishing student newspapers, and distributing student
newspapers, were directly related to First Amendment issues.
the instant case, there are no First Amendment issues.

Here,
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In

there is no expression of ideas through the photographs involved.
First Amendment expression arguments are simply not applicable.
This case, then, must be analyzed by the same standards as any
other case in which free speech issues are not involved.

Under

those standards, the appellants' convictions must stand.

POINT II
EVEN WERE FREE SPEECH CONSIDERATIONS AT ISSUE
IN THE INSTANT CASE, UTAH CODE ANN., § 76-101206.5, AS APPLIED AGAINST THE APPELLANTS, rs
NOT AN OVERBROAD INFRINGEMENT ON THE RIGHT TO
FREE SPEECH OR EXPRESSION, AND THE APPELLANTS
SHOULD NOT BE ALLOWED TO RAISE THE OVERBREADTH
ISSUE IN THEIR DEFENSE.
Even were there free speech issues in the instant case,
the appellants have no standing to challenge Utah Code Ann.,
§

76-10-1206.5, either on its face on the basis of the possible
thir~

application of the statute to

persons, or as applied to

them.
In Points I and III of their brief, the appellants argue
that the State's position appears to be that nudity in and of
itself is a sufficient violation of the law to justify conviction.
Further, the appellants argue that when the definition of nudity
is read into Utah Code Ann.,

§

rendered hopelessly overbroad.

76-10-1206.5, the statute is
To illustrate their point, in

fact, the appellants have attached to their brief a greeting card
which, under their reading of the statute, involved "nudity for
profit," and would thus be proscribed by law.

-12-
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In this case, the appellants have no standing to raise a
"parade of horribles."

Under the information charging the

appellants with sexual exploitation of a minor, no charge or
mention of photographing a minor in the nude for profit was made.
Rather, the information filed against the appellants narrowly
states:
The undersigned Pete Hansen under oath states on
information and belief that the defendants committed
the crimes of:
sexual exploitation of a minor, a second-degree
felony, at Utah County, Utah, on or about September
15, 1981, in violation of § 76-10-1206.5, Utah
Criminal Code, as amended, in that they, at the time
and place aforesaid, knowingly and intentionally
used, persuaded, induced, or enticed Holly
Wilkerson, a minor, to pose in the nude while
simulating sexual conduct for the purpose of photographing, filming, recording, or displaying sexual
or simulated sexual conduct.
( R. 2 ) ( s e e Append ix " C" ) .
Since Utah Code Ann.,

§

76-10-1206.5 is worded in the

disjunctive, i.e.:
A person is guilty of sexual exploitation of a minor
who knowingly employs, uses, persuades, induces,
entices or coerces any minor to pose in the nude for
the purpose of sexual arousal of any person or for
profit or to engage in any sexual or simulated
sexual conduct . . . ,
neither a recitation in the complaint nor a finding by the trial
court of posing in the nude for prof it was necessary.

There was

no problem in charging and finding the appellants guilty of sexual
exploitation of a minor without any mention of nudity for profit.
Thus, at this point in the proceedings, the appellants are
-13-
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petitioning this Court for a Declaratory Judgment on a statutory
interpretation which has not been applied to them.

This petition

should be ignored.
Because the appellants were not charged with photographing a minor in the nude for profit, the respondent submits
that they have no standing to assert the defense of overbreadth of
the statute based on a reading of "nudity for profit."

See State

v. Phillips, Utah, 540 P.2d 936 (1975):
Also important to be considered as pertaining to the
problem in this case, is the principle that no one
should be entitled to challenge a statute and have
it declared void because it may unjustly affect
someone else, but could properly do so only if his
own rights are adversely affected.
Id. at 940.
1976).

See also:

Dileo v. Greenfield, 541 F.2d 949 (2d Cir.

This, coupled with the fact that the appellants have never

asserted that the statute was erroneously applied to them, should
preclude the appellants from raising any possible "overbreadth"issues as they may affect third persons, under either the United
States or Utah Constitutions.
The appellants assert standing to facially challenge
Ut~

Code Ann.,§ 76-10-1206.5 (1953), as amended, now as it may

affect third persons based on Doran v. Salem Inn, 422 U.S. 930
(1975), stating:
Appellants in this case, then, clearly have the
right to challenge the statute in question, even if
the acts alleged by the State in this particular
instance could validly be prohibited.
See appellants' brief, page 7.

Doran, however,

is distinguishable

both on its facts and in its holding, and is inapplicable in
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determining the appellants' standing.

In Doran, the plaintiff

sought federal injunctive relief from the prospective application
of a local ordinance banning topless dancing.

Although the

plaintiff asserted that he was threatened with possible
prosecution under the statute, he had not, at the time he filed
the injunction, in fact, had any charges filed against him. In
Doran, the Court, after finding that the practical effect of
injunctive relief and declaratory relief is identical, and
stating:
Moreover, neither declaratory nor injunctive relief
can directly interfere with enforcement of contested
statutes or ordinances except with respect to the
particular federal plaintiffs, and the State is free
to prosecute others who may violate the statute,
422 U.S. at 931, found that because the plaintiff had met the
requirements for the issuance of an injunction, i.e., a showing of
prospective personal irreparable injury and a likelihood of
success on the merits, the issuance of the injunction by the
federal court was proper.

The court, after stating that the case

was "a close one," found that since the plaintiffs had shown that
absent preliminary relief they would suffer substantial economic
harm through the application of the statute, an injunction was
proper, even though the statute could possibly have been
constitutionally applied to the plaintiffs.

The Court expressly

intimated "no view as to the ultimate merits of respondent's
contentions."

422 U.S. at 916.

In the instant case, the appellants are not seeking to
prospectively enjoin, through federal process, the application of
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a state statute which, in the future, may impact on them
economically, as were the plaintiffs in Doran.

Rather, the

appellants here have been convicted and now seek, too late, to
challenge on its face the statute which was constitutionally
applied to them as it may be applied to third persons.

This type

of challenge, retrospective rather than prospective, challenging a
conviction rather than applying for an injunction, and based on a
possible application of a statute to third persons rather than the
challengers, is not allowed under the Doran standards.

In fact,

the Doran court stated that even where an injunction had issued,
state prosectuions could proceed against other potential
defendants.
Here, then, the appellants are too late to challenge
Utah Code Ann., § 76-10-1206.5 (1953), as amended, on its face
under Doran.

For the appellants to have had standing to make such

a challenge under Doran, an application for injunctive relief,
coupled with a showing of prospective irreparable harm through
prosecution and a likelihood of success on the merits, must have
been made.

Having failed tn follow these procedures specifically

set out by the Supreme Court in Doran,

the appellants cannot now

twist the policies behind injunctive relief to apply retrospectively once a prosecution has proceeded and a conviction properly
obtained.

Under Doran, the appellants have no standing to

challenge the statute.
The same policies which were controlling in Doran also
preclude the appellants from challenging the statute at this
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point on the basis of violation of the Utah State Constitution.
While a challenge to the statute on that basis could have been
brought under the Utah Uniform Declaratory Judgments Act, Utah
Code Ann., § 78-33-1, et seq.

(1953), as amended, upon a showing

that the appellants' rights would be impaired by the contested
legislation, this Court has indicated that such a challenge must
be brought before an actual prosecution under the challenged
statute has occurred.

In Baird v. State, Utah, 574 P.2d 713

(1978), this Court stated:
A plaintiff may seek and obtain a declaration as to
whether a statute is constitutional by averring in
his pleading the grounds upon which he will be
directly damaged in his person or property by its
enforcement; by alleging facts indicating how he
will be damaged by its enforcement; that defendant
is enforcing such statute or has a duty or ability
to enforce it; and the enforcement will impinge upon
plaintiff's legal or constitutional rights.
A
complaint is insufficient which merely challenges
the constitutionality of a statute, without in some
way indicating that plaintiff will be affected by
its operation or is subject to its terms and
provisions.

Id. at 716.
Under Baird and Doran, the appellants are too late to
petition for a declaratory judgment on the constitutionality of
Utah Code Ann.,§ 76-10-1206.5 (1953), as amended.

Had the

appellants been as concerned about the possible unconstitutional
application of the statute to them or third persons at the time
when they could properly have challenged the statute under either
the Feaeral or State constitutions as they profess to be now, they
could and should have brought the necessary actions in opposition
-17-
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to the prospective application of the statute.

Their attempt to

petition this Court now for a sweeping declaratory ruling on the
statute's constitutionality is too little too late.
....

At this

point, the appellants are without standing to raise those issues.
Just as Doran and Baird prohibit the appellants from now
raising a challenge based on prospective application of the
statute to third persons, the recent case of New York v. Ferber,
cited supra, leaves the appellants without standing to raise an
"overbreadth" challenge as a defense after their convictions.
In Ferber, the United States Supreme Court dealt
directly with whether, after conviction, a defendant could raise
the defense of the "First Amendment overbreadth" of a child
pornography statute as it may be applied to third persons.

The

Court recognized the traditional rule that a person to whom a
statute may constitutionally be applied may not challenge that
statute on grounds that it may conceivably be applied
unconstitutionally to others in situations not before the Court.
31 Cr.L.R. at 3145 (see also:

State v. Phillips, supra).

While

recognizing that what has come to be known as the "First Amendment
overbreadth doctrine" is one of the few exceptions to this general
principle and must be justified by "weighty countervailing
policies," United States v. Raines, 362 U.S. 17 (1960), the Court
stated that because the wide-reaching effects of striking a
statute down on its face is "strong medicine" to be employed "only
as a last resort," Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 600 (1973),
there must be a showing of "substantial overbreadth" before a
statute will be

invali~ated.

31 Cr.L.R. at 3145.
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In Broadrick, the Court found that where conduct as well
as speech is involved, a greater showing of "substantial
overbreadth" must be made than where "pure speech" is involved,
stating:
. • . the plain import of our cases is, at the very
least, that facial overbreadth adjudication is an
exception to our traditional rules of practice and
that its function, a limited one at the outset,
attenuates as the otherwise unprotected behavior
that it forbids the state to sanction moves from
"pure speech" toward conduct, and that conduct--even
if expressive--falls within the scope of otherwise
valid criminal laws that reflect legitimate state
interest in maintaining comprehensive controls over
harmful, constitutionally unprotected conduct.
Although such laws, if too broadly worded, may deter
protected speech to some unknown extent, there comes
a point where that ef fect--at best a
prediction--cannot, with confidence, justify
invalidating a statute on its face and so
prohibiting a state from enforcing the statute
against conduct that is admittedly within its power
to proscribe [citation omitted].
To put the matter
another way, particularly where conduct and not
merely speech is involved, we believe that the
overbreadth of a statute must not only be real, but
substantial as well, judged in relation to the
statute's plainly legitimate sweep.
412 U.S. at 615.

The Court then held that the Oklahoma Hatch Act statute
challenged in Broadrick, which prohibited classified service
employees from soliciting, receiving, or in any way being
concerned in soliciting or receiving any assessment or
contribution for political organizations, candidacies, or other
political purposes, as well as prohibition against an employee
belonging to any national, state or local committee of a political
party, was not "substantially overbroad" as it affected conduct as
well as speech, stating:
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It is our view that § 818 is not substantially
overbroad and that whatever overbreadth may exist
should be cured by case-by-case analysis of the fact
situations to which its sanctions, assertively, may
not be applied.
Id. at 615-616.
The Ferber Court,

in finding that the New York child

pornography law was not "substantially overbroad," recognized the
principle enunciated in Broadrick and further stated:
The premise that a law should not be invalidated for
overbreadth unless it reaches a substantial number
of impermissible applications is hardly novel.
On
most occasions involving facial invalidation, the
court has stressed the embracing sweep of the
statute over protected expression.
Indeed Justice
Brennan observed in his dissenting opinion in
Broadrick:
"We have never held that a statute should be held
invalid on its face merely because it is possible to
conceive of a single impermissible application, and
in that sense a requirement of substantial
overbreadth is already implicit in the doctrine."
413 U.S. at 630.
The requirement of substantial overbreadth is
directly derived from the purpose and nature of the
doctrine. While a sweeping statute, or one
incapable of limitation, has the potential to
repeatedly chill the exercise of expressive activity
by many individuals, the extent of deterrence of
protected speech can be expected to decrease with
the declining reach of the requlation.
This
observation appears equally applicable to the
publication of books and films as it is to
activities, such as picketing or participation in
election campaigns, which have previouslv been
categorized as involving conduct plus sp~ech.
We
see no appreciable difference between a publisher or
bookseller in doubt as to the reach of New York's
child pornography law and the situation faced by the
Oklahoma State Employees with respect to that
state's restrictions on partisan political activity.
Indeed, it could be reasonably argued that the
bookseller, with an economic incentive to sell
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materials that may fall within the statute's scope,
may be less likely to be deterred than the employee
who wishes to engage in political campaign activity.
Cf. Bates v. State Bar of Arizona, 433 U.S. 350,
380-381 (1977) (overbreadth analysis inapplicable to
commercial speech).
31 Cr.L.R. at 3146.

In the instant case, as was mentioned above,

appellants' activities essentially amounted to conduct only.

If

any "speech" was involved, such speech deserves de minimus
protection since it is coupled with conduct, and is thus, at most,
within the "substantial overbreadth" standard enunciated in
Broadrick and Ferber.

While neither Broadrick nor Ferber gave a

standardized test for determining "substantial overbreadth," it is
worth noting that in both cases, the Court upheld the statutes in
.question.

In finding the New York statute, § 263.15,

constitutional, the Court stated:
[W]e consider this the paradigmatic case of a
state statute whose legitimate reach dwarfs its
arguably impermissible applications.
New York, as
we have held, may constitutionally prohibit
dissemination of materials specified in§ 263.15.
31 Cr.L.R. at 3146.

The Court expressed "serious doubt" that the

arguably impermissible applications of the statute amount to more
than a tiny fraction of the materials within the statute's reach,
and further stated:
[n]or will we assume that the New York courts will
widen the possibly invalid reach of the statute by
giving an expansive construction to the proscription
on "lewd exhibition(s) of the genitals."

-21-
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31 Cr.L.R. at 3146.

Applying this logic to the instant case, this

court should affirm the findings of the lower court that as
applied
to these appellants, the statute is not unconstitutionally
....
overbroad, and that the arguably impermissible applications of the
statute, exemplified by the "parade of horribles" referred to in
the appellants' brief and exhibited in the appendix to their
brief, do not amount to more than a tiny fraction of the materials
within the statute's reach, or that the courts will widen the
possibly invalid reach of the statute by giving an expansive and
unconstitutional construction to the language of the statute.
Under the circumstances, Utah Code Ann., § 76-101206.5 (1953), as amended, is "not substantially overbroad and
whatever overbreadth exists should be cured through caseby-case analysis of the fact situations to which its sanctions
assertively may not be applied."

Broadrick, supra, at

Ferber, supra, 31 Cr.L.R. at 3146.

615-616~

Thus, even if the appellants

could show that the activities of which they were convicted are
entitled to First Amendment protections, because their actions
involved conduct as well as speech, a showing of "substantial
overbreadth" must be made.

Since no "substantial overbreadth" has

or can be shown by the appellants in their case, they are without
standing to assert the "overbreadth" issue and should be precluded
fr om raising the is sue on appeal.
U.S.

, 101

s.ct.

See also:

H. L. v. Matheson,

1164 (1981), and Parker v. Levy, 417

733 (1974).
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POINT III
UNDER NEW YORK V.
§

FERBER, UTAH CODE ANN.,

76-10-1206.5 (1953), AS AMENDED, AS APPLIED

TO THESE APPELL.~NTS, IS NOT AN UNCONSTITUTIONAL INFRINGEMENT ON THE RIGHT OF FREE

SPEECH OR EXPRESSION.
As pointed out in Point I, the recent landmark decision
of New York v. Ferber,

U.S.

, 31 Cr.L.R. 3139 (1982),

definitively resolved the issue of what protection the
dissemination of child pornography was to be given under the First
Amendment of the United States Constitution.

Assuming, arguenao,

that the appellants had standing to raise the issues of free
speech and expression under the First Amendment, Ferber's holding
that no First Amendment protections extend to the distribution of
child pornography render tne appellants' arguments without merit.
In Ferber, a 9-0 Court specifically found five grounds
for denying First Amendment protection to the distribution of
child pornography.
The Court first found that the State's interest in
"safeguarding the physical and psychological well being of a
minor" is "compelling."
U.S.

Globe Newspapers v. Superior Court,

(1982), cited at 31 Cr.L.R. at 3142.

The

prevention of sexual exploitation and abuse of children
constitutes a government objective of surpassing importance.
Court held:
The legislative judgment, as well as the judgment
found in the relevant literature, is that the use of
children as subjects of pornographic materials is
harmful to the physiological, emotional, and mental
health of the child.
That judgment, we think,
easily passes muster under the First Amendment.

31 Cr.L.R. at 3142.
-23-
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The

The Court's second reason for its holding was that the
standard previously set out in Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15
(1973), that in order to find a work pornographic, it must, taken
'
as a whole, appeal to the prurient interest of the average person,
"bears no connection to the issue of whether a child has been
physically or psychologically harmed in the production of the
work."

31 Cr.L.R. at 3143.

Thus, because the distribution of

photographs and films depicting sexual activity by juveniles is
intrinsically related to the sexual abuse of children, it is
irrelevant to the determination of the overriding issue of the
protection of children whether the

material has a literary,

artistic, political, or social value, and "we therefore cannot
conclude that the Miller standard is a satisfactory solution to
the child pornography problem."

31 Cr.L.R. at 3143.

Third, the Court recognized that the production of child
pornography is illegal throughout the nation, and that since the
advertising and selling of child pornography provides an economic
motive for that production, the First Amendment protections given
the advertising are outweighed by the State's interest in
protecting children.

See Point I, supra.

The fourth reason for

uphol~ing

Ferber's conviction was

based upon the finding that the value of permitting live
performances and photographic reproductions of children engaged in
lewd sexual conduct is "exceedingly modest,

if not de minimus."

-24-
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The Court stated:
We consider it unlikely that visual depictions of
children performing sexual acts or lewdly exhibiting
their genitals would often constitute an important
and necessary part of a literary performance or
scientific or education work.
31 Cr.L.R. at 3143.
Fifth, the Court found that a recognition and
classification of child pornography as a special category outside
the protection of First Amendment protections is not incompatible
with earlier decisions construing the First Amendment.

In this

regard, the Court stated:
. . . It is not rare that a content-based
classification of speech has been accepted because
it may be appropriately generalized that within the
confines of a given classification, the evil to be
restricted to overwhelmingly outweighs the
expressive interests, if any, at stake, that no
process of case-by-case adjudication is required.
When a definable class of material, such as that
covered by § 263.15, bears so heavily and
pervasively on the welfare of children engaged in
its production, we think the balance of competing
interests is clearly struck and that it is
permissible to consider these materials as without
the protection of the First Amendment.
31 Cr.L.R. at 3144.
After setting forth these five criteria, the Court
enunciated a new test governing child pornography cases, separate

from the obscenity standard of Miller, stating:
The Miller formulation is adjusted in the following
respects:
a trier of fact need not fino that the
material appeals to the prurient interest of the
average person; it is not required that sexual
conduct portrayed be done so in a patently offensive
manner; and the material at issue need not be
considered as a whole.
31 Cr.L.R. at 3144.
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In the instant case, even assuming, arguendo, that the
appellants' brief presented valid free speech issues to this
Court, both the rationale and the holding of the Ferber case

"

render the appellants' points without merit.
Here, the state's interest in protecting minors is at
least as compelling as was that of New York in passing the
legislation upheld in Ferber.

In fact,

the appellants recognize

that the legislative purpose behind the Utah statute, as well as
other state statutes dealing with child pornography,

is "to

prohibit the use of minors in pornographic photographs and films"
(see appellants' brief, page 5).

Such is a valid state purpose.

Here, also, as in Ferber, analysis of the child pornography
problem is not adequately handled under the Miller standard (see
Point I of this brief).

Since the purpose of the statute at issue

here is to prohibit the abuse of children, the issue of the
resulting work's literary, artistic, or social value is, if an
issue at all, to be weighed in light of the statute's purpose.
As mentioned supra, this case involves the production
rather than the distribution of child pornography.

Even were

production of child pornography to be seen as holding the same
free speech protection of distribution, no First Amendment
protection can be found for such activity since any free speech
protections are outweighed by the State's interest in protecting
children.
Here, as well, the value of producing child pornography
through the sexual exploitation of a minor is "exceedingly modest,
if not de minimus."

It can hardly be argued that the photographs
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entered into evidence in the appellants' trial constitute an
important ana necessary part of a literary performance or a
scientific or educational work (see Exhibits 1-30).
Given these facts, coupled with the United States
Supreme Court's determination that child pornography falls without
the pale of First Amendment protection, it cannot be asserted that
the trial court's finding of guilt deprived the appellants of free
speech protection, either under the United States Constitution or
under the Utah Constitution, Article I, § 15, which provides in
pertinent part:
No law shall be passed to abridge or restrain
the freedom of speech or of the press.
For the same reasons underlying the United States Supreme Court's
decision in Ferber that child pornography is not protected under
the First Amendment to the United States Constitution, this Court
should find that the Utah Constitution, the provisions of which
closely parallel those of the United States Constitution, does not
include child pornography within its protective ambit.
The Supreme Court's adjustment in Ferber of the
formulation of the Miller standard as regards child pornography
renders the cases relied upon by the appellants--Roth v. United
States, 344 U.S. 476 (1957); Miller, ci tea supra; and Rome Box
Office, Inc. v. Wilkinson, Civil No. C-81-0331J (D.C. Utah 19 82)
inapplicable in this case, even were this case to be seen as one
involving free speech issues.

Strict adherence to the

requirements that materials appeal to the prurient interest,
portray sexual conduct in a patently offensive manner, and as
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a whole offend community standards is, under Ferber, not required.
Those cases cited by the appellant which hold to the contrary are
old \law,

ann irrelevant within the context of this case.
Under Ferber, then, the First Amendment issues raised by

the appellants are meri tles s, and the appellants' cause based on
free speech issues should be rejected.
POINT IV
SINCE NEITHER THE RIGHT TO PRIVACY NOR FAMILY
RIGHTS ARE INVOLVED IN THIS CASE, THE
APPELLANTS SHOULD NOT BE ALLOWED TO CHALLENGE
UTAH CODE ANN.,§ 76-10-1206.5 ON THOSE
GROUNDS.
In Point II of their brief, the appellants have raised
the defense of a right of privacy, citing Stanley v.

Georgia, 394

U.S. 557 (1969), arguing that because "a state has no business
telling a man,

sitting alone in his own house, what books he may

read or what films he may watch," 394 U.S. at 565, the acts of the
appellants constituting the production of child pornography are
protected.

Such an argument is patently illogical.

In the

instant case, there was no issue raised as to the appellants'
right to read, watch, or observe sexually explicit materials, the
central issue in Stanley.

Here, as has been previously mentioned

and has been recognizec1 by the appellants, the purpose behind the
child pornography statute in question goes beyond the acts of an·
adult in the privacy of his own home.

It extends to the

prohibition, within the state's police power, of the employment or
use of a child to engage in activities from which the State has
validly chosen to protect him.

In view of this State goal,
- 2S-
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the

appellants' right of privacy, like First Amendment rights, if any
be extant, must be weighed in the balance of competing policies
and factors.

See Ferber, supra, at 3134.

The appellants' attempt to assert the minor's right of
privacy as a shield for the appellants (see appellants' brief,
page 21) is misplaced in any case.

While it may be true that a

minor is protected, under a right of privacy, to view obscene
materials, under the Stanley doctrine (although under Ginsberg v.
New York, 390 U.S. 629 (1968), this is not clear), and are, as
asserted by the appellants, entitled to limited guarantees of free
speech, the minor's rights cannot be asserted by third parties
charged with employing, using, or enticing that minor for criminal
purposes.
It is ironic that the appellants, by whose conduct the
minor's privacy was in a real sense violated, should rely on a
defense of an unwarranted governmental intrusion into their
privacy by prosecution under the child pornography statute.

In

essence the appellants are asserting a right of privacy to shield
them in violating another person's privacy.

Such an assertion is,

at best, puzzling.
Equally baffling is the appellants' argument, raised for
the first time on appeal, that Utah Code Ann.,§ 76-10~1206.5
interferes with the relationship of a parent to his child.

As a

general rule, this Court will not consider an issue for the first
time on appeal.

State v. Hales, Utah, No. 18083, decided July 7,

1982; State v. Treadway, 28 Utah 2d 160, 499 P.2d

84~

(1972);

State v. Starlight Club, 17 Utah 2d 174, 408 P.2d 912 (1965).
-29-
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Even assuming, arguendo, that there were no problems with raising
this issue for the first time on appeal, the appellants have no
standing to raise the "family rights" argument. Here, neither of
the appellants was related in any way to the minor, nor were they
related legally to each other, despite the fact that they were
apparently cohabitating (see appellants' brief, page 2). It is
interesting to note that the minor's mother, who testified against
the appellants,

indicated that if the relationship between parent

and child had in this case been interfered with, it had been done
by the appellants

(R. 143-146).

For this reason, coupled with the

fact that the appellants have no standing to raise the "family
rights" issue as regards third persons for the reasons enunciated
in the "overbreadth" and "vagueness" arguments above, the
appellants' arguments regarding "family rights" are without merit
and should not be countenanced.
POINT V
UT~9 CODE AN~., § 76-10-1206.5 (1953), AS
AMENDED, IS NOT VOID FOR VAGUENESS.

In Point III of their brief, the appellants argue that
since there is no statutory definition of "simulated sexual
conduct," which is proscribed by statute and is charged in the
information against the appellants, a defense that the statute is
void for vagueness applies.
Under current standards, a law is not unconstituionally
vague unless it fails to give a person of ordinary intelligence
reasonable opportunity to know what the statute proscribes.
-30-
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Smith v. Goguen, 415 U.S. 566 (1974); Grayned v. City of Rockford,
408 U.S. 104 (1972); Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 405

U.S. 156 {1972).
The courts have recognized that where commonsense
understanding reveals the general nature of the conduct
prohibited, the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
does not mandate complete certainty about the meaning of statutory
terms.

Thus,

in a recent case,

the Colorado Supreme Court held

that:
Where fairness can be achieved by a commonsense
reading of the statute, we will not adopt a
bypertechnical construction to invalidate the
provision.
People v. Garcia, Colo., 595 P.2d 228, 231 (1979).
State v. Randolph, Kan.,

597 P.2d 672 (1979).

Lines v. United States, 342 U.S. 337

(1952),

See also:

In Boyce Motor
the Supreme Court of

the United States wrote:
. [F]ew words possess the precision of
mathematical symbols.
Most statutes must deal with
untold and unforeseen variations in factual
situations, and the practical necessities of
government inevitably limit the specificity with
which legislators can spell out prohibitions.
Consequently, no more than a reasonable degree of
certaintv can be demanded.
Nor is it unfair to
require ihat one who deliberately goes perilously
close to an area of proscribed conduct shall take
the risk that he may cross the line.
342 U.S.

337, 340.
This Court has also recognized the principle in State v.

Packard, 122 Utah 369, 250 P.2d 561 (1952).

The Court there
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stated:
The limitations of language are such that neither
absolute exactitude nor complete precision of
meaning are to be expected, and such standard cannot
be required.
250 P.2d 561, 564.

Respondent submits that the phrase "simulated

sexual conduct" is sufficiently precise to give a person of
ordinary intelligence notice that the type of conduct in which
appellants engaged is prohibited.

The term "sexual conduct" is

precisely defined in Utah Code Ann.,
§

76-10-1201(7):

"Sexual conduct" means acts of masturbation, sexual
intercourse, or any touching of a person's clothes
or unclothed genitals, pubic area, buttocks, or, if
the person is a female, breast, whether alone or
between members of the same or opposite sex or
between humans and animals in an act of apparent or
actual sexual stimulation or gratification.
Contrary to the appellants' assertion, the definition entails acts
that can be performed by one person.

In fact, it can hardly be

envisioned that a person of ordinary, common intelligence would
not, based upon the definition of "sexual conduct" and the
explicit prohibitions of Utah Code Ann.,

§

76-10-1206.5 (1953}, as

amended, be able to discern what type of activity is statutorily
proscribed, simply because a precise definition of "simulated" is
not given in the statute.
The respondent submits that in the absence of a
statutory definition, the word "simulated" should be given its
dictionary meaning.

For example, Webster's New Collegiate

Dictionary (1973), gives as the definition of "simulate":
-32-
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To copy, represent, feign,
1:
to assume the outward qualities or appearance
of, usu. with the intent to deceive.
It 'Should be pointea out that since the term "simulate" is not a
legal term, reference to stanaard works of common usage, such as
the aictionary,

is appropriate.

This common aefinition of

"simulate" is a far cry from the appellants' seemingly intentional
twisting of the definition to mean "almost."

It strains the

imagination to believe that the appellants were so ignorant of the
common usage of common phrases proscribing their behavior that
they aid not know it was illegal.
In dealing with a similar challenge to statutory
language the United States Supreme Court, in Broadrick v.
Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 600 (1973), discussea supra, founa that
Oklahoma's Hatch Act, which did not include definitions of the
terms "airect or inairect contribution," was not void for
vagueness.

The court recognizea that the appellants in that case

had conceded that the state's purpose in enacting the act was
proper, but contended that:
. . [i)ts language is unconstitutionally vague and
its prohibitions too broad in their swee~, failing
to distinguish between conduct that may be
proscribed ana conduct that must be permitte0.
413 U.S. at 608.

The Court responded by saying that:

We have little aoubt that § 818 is . . . not so
vague that "men of common intelligence must
necessarily guess at its meaning" . . . [cites
omitted] . . . Whatever other problems there are
with § 818, it is all but frivolous to suggest that
-3 3-
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the section fails to give adequate warning of what
activities it proscribes or fails to set out
"explicit standards" for those who must apply it
. In the plainest language it prohibits any
state classified employee from being "an officer or
member" of a partisan political club" or a candidate
for "any paid public office."
It forbids
solicitation of contributions "for any political
organization, candidacy or other political
organization, candidacy or other political purpose"
and taking part "in the management or affairs of any
political party or in any political campaign."
Words inevitably contain germs of uncertainty and,
as with the Hatch Act, there may be disputes over
the meaning of such terms in § 818 as "part is an," or
"take part in," or "affairs of" political parties.
But what was said in Letter Carriers, supra, 413
U.S., at 578-579, 93 S.Ct., at 3897, is applicable
here:
"There are limitations in the English
language with respect to being both specific and
manageably brief, and it seems to us that although
the prohibitions may not satisfy those intent on
finding fault at any cost, they are set out in terms
that the ordinary person exercising ordinary common
sense can sufficiently understand and comply with,
without sacrifice to the public interest."
Id. at 607-608 (Emphasis in original).
The instant matter is very similar to that presented to
the Court in Broadrick.

Here, as has been previously pointed out,

the appellants recognize the valid state purpose behind the
stat~tory

prohibition of sexual exploitation of a minor.

Here, as

in Broadrick, the fact that words of common everyday use are not
statutorily defined is used as a subterfuge to avoid punishment
under the statute.

It cannot be asserted, however, based on the

evidence and the exhibits in this case, that the appellants could
not sufficiently understand the statute and comply with its
requirements because of a misunderstanding of the word
" s i mu 1 a tea . "

see Sa 1 t Lake C i t

1299 (1977).

In fact,

y

v . Piepenburg ,

ut ah ,

5 7 1 P . 2a

although the appellants were not charged
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with using Holly Wilkerson to engage in "actual," rather than
"simulated," sexual conduct,

it appears from the exhibits in this

cas€ that such a charge could have been properly made.
It is interesting to note that the appellants apparently
accept the federal statute, 18

u.s.c.

§

2252 as sufficiently

specific (see appellants' brief, page 14), although that statute
defines "sexually explicit conduct" as "actual or simulated" acts,
without a statutory definition of "simulated."
tionality of 18

u.s.c.

The constitu-

§ 2251 also seems to have been impliedly

accepted by the United States Supreme Court in Ferber.
Cr.L.R. at 3143, fn.

See 31

15.

Because the appellants' activities clearly fall within
the "hard core of the statute's proscriptions," Broadrick, supra,
at 609, the appellants are without standing to challenge the
statute on the basis of vagueness.

See Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S.

733, 756:

[O]ne to whose conduct a statute clearly applies may
not successfully challenge it for vagueness.
Thus,

the appellants' resurrect ion of a "parade of horribles" for

the second time in their brief,

in the context of a distorted

hypothesis of the meaning of the word "simulated," proposed by the
appellants to mean "almost," should not be seen as raising any
valid issues.

The exhibits in this case indicate that the

appellants were not concerned with how closely or far apart from
the victim's nude body they could get before "almost touching," as
their brief would indicate.

Such arcane semantical distinctions
-35-
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are simply not at issue in this case, in which a finding of use of
the victim to simulate sexual conduct was justified and
appropriate.

If, as the appellants assert, there is an "apparent

difficulty in using a 'common sense' approach to the meaning" of
the word "simulated," such a difficulty appears to be found only
with the appellants {see appellants' brief, page 27).

Common

sense would indicate to the ordinary person that the appellants'
actions were illegal.

The appellants' actions being within the

"hard core of the statute's proscriptions" precludes the
appellants from having standing to raise "vagueness" as a
defense.
In asserting, without follow-up,

that the state's

position in this case appears to be that nudity without more is a
sufficient violation of the law to justify conviction, the
appellants unnecessarily obscure the "vagueness" issue, confusing
it with that of "overbreadth," treated supra.

As has been

previously pointed out, the appellants were not charged solely
with using the victim to pose in the nude, nor were the
appellants' convictions based on such a finding.

The appellants'

attempt to raise the "nudity without more" issue under the rubrik
of vagueness is illogical and unwarranted.

Since the appellants

were neither chargea nor convicted under such a standard, they
have no standing to raise it under any theory.

See State v.

Phillips, supra.
If the appellants' point in raising the "nudity" issue
is to show statutory vagueness in the definition of "nudity,"
although that is by no means clear in their argument,

it should be
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pointed out that "nudity" is specifically defined statutorily in
Utah Code Ann., § 76-10-1201(6):
,

"Nudity" means the showing of the human male or
female genitals, pubic area, or buttocks, with less
than an opaque covering, or the showing of a female
breast with less than an opaque covering, or any
portion thereof below the top of the nipple, or the
depiction of covered male genitals in a discernablv
turgid state.
_,

The appellants neither have nor can assert, based on either a
statutory or "common sense" definition, that at the time of the
crime they did not know their conduct was illegal because they
could not understand the meaning of the word "nudity."

The

definition is not vague.
POINT VI
THERE WAS NO DEFECT IN THE ISSUANCE OF THE
SEAR CH WARRANT.
In Point IV of their brief, the appellants raise two
issues regarding the adequacy of the affidavit upon which the
search· warrant was issued.

First, the appellants assert that

because Officer Stewart Winn of the Orem Police Department, the
affiant, did not personally view the materials to be seized under
the warrant, but relied upon information from a confidential
informant, the warrant was fatally defective.

Second, the

appellants state that there was a lack of sufficient specificity
i~ the affidavit to allow the magistrate

to "searchingly focus" 6n

the First Amendment issue of obscenity as required under Lee Art
Theatre, Inc. v. Virginia, 392 U.S. 636 (1969), Utah Code Ann., §
76-10-1212(1), and State v. Piepenburg, Utah, 602 P.2d 702 (1979).
-37-
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It should be noted at the outset that both of the
appellants' arguments were presented to the court below at a
suppression hearing, and were found to be without merit (R.
85-92).

The finding of the trial court should be considered by

this Court in a light most favorable to the State.

State v.

Mccardell, Utah Supreme Court Case No. 17718 (decided August 27,
1982).
Under the standards set forth in the United States
Supreme Court cases of Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108 (1964), and
Spinelli v. United States, 394 U.S. 410 (1969), there is no
requirement that an af fiant personally view the material to be
seized where information relied on comes from a confidential
informant.

Under the Aguilar-Spinelli test, where information

from an informant is relied upon in the issuance of a warrant, the
warrant is valid if the information received from the informant
can be shown to be reliable.

This is done by the satisfaction of

what has been characterized as a "two-prong test."

Under the

first prong, it must be shown that the informant had a "basis of
knowledge" for the information given the affiant.

The second

requirement of Aguilar-Spinelli is that underlying facts be given
the magistrate from which he could conclude that the informant
himself was reliable.

This has

~en

"veracity" prong of Aguilar-Spinelli.

characterized as the
See Spinelli v. United

States, 393 U.S. at 416, and LaFave, Search and Seizure:

A

Treatise on the Fourth Amendment (1978), § 3.3, Information from
an Informant.

In the present case, both prongs of the

Aguilar-Spinelli test were fully satisfied.

There has never been
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a constitutional requirement that the affiant actually see the
materials to be seized, regardless of the appellants' assertions
to the contrary.

Rather, as in Spinelli, an officer-affiant is

'\

justified in relying upon the representations made by ~n informant
where the informant's reliability can be shown.
Treadway, 28 Utah 2d 160, 499 P.2d 846 (1972).

See State v.
In fact,

the

"basis of knowledge" prong of Spinelli may be satisfied by
relating credible hearsay which indicates that the confidential
informant has observed firsthand or has reason to believe, based
again on credible hearsay,
the af fiant.

the facts to which he has attested to

Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. at 425

{concurring opinion by White, J.).

See also:

United States v.

Freeman, 532 F.2d 1098, 1100 (7th Cir. 1976), and State v. Yaw,
Hawaii, 572 P.2d 856 (1977).
Despite the appellants'

argument that the information in

the affidavit is insufficiently detailed and is based solely on
conclusory assertions, the evidence indicates that the information
contained in the affidavit was sufficiently detailed and
indicative of the informant's "basis of knowledge" as to have
justified the issuance of the warrant.

The affidavit specifically

stated:
Confidential informant "Gorgo" visited Robert 1Jordan
at 7 54 South 5 0 East, Orem, Utah County, Utah, on
November 1, 1981.
Terry Fullmer offered to sell
"Gorgo" some stolen unexposed film.
"Gorgo" asked
what they used the film for.
They then showed him a
stack of approximately 50 Polaroid snapshots.
They
all showed Holly Wilkerson, Terry Fullmer, and
Robe rt Jordan engaging in, or simulating sex acts.
"Gorgo" describes Holly as approximately 15 years
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old, tall and redheaded.
That matches the physical
description of the runaway Holly Wilkerson.
"Gorgo"
was told that they intend to sell the photographs to
"Penthouse Magazine."
(R. 4).

The fact that the informant had personally seen the

Polaroid snapshots, had described a victim as "approximately 15
years old, tall, and redheaded," which description matched that of
the victim, Holly Wilkerson, and set out in detail the
circumstances under which he became aware of the information which
was relayed in the affidavit indicates a sufficient "basis of
knowledge" on the informant's part to indicate the reliability of
the information given.
The "veracity" prong of the Aguilar-Spinelli test was
·satisfied in the officer-affiant's recitation that the informant
"has proven reliable in the past assisting this department in
numerous narcotic operations now pending prosecution" (R. 4).
Under Spinelli, this description is sufficiently detailed, going
beyond a mere conclusory allegation that the informant is
"reliable."

See also:

McCray v. Illinois, 386 U.S. 300 (1967);

United States v .. Freeman, supra.

In the instant case, then, the

informant's "basis of knowledge" and "veracity" were shown in the
affidavit, satisfying both prongs of the Aguilar-Spinelli test.
The appellants' second argument, that the affidavit was
insufficiently detailed to allow the magistrate to "searchingly
focus" on the issue of obscenity to establish probable cause for
issuance of the warrant, as required by State v. Piepenburg, cited
supra,

is also meritless.
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Notwithstanding the appellants' attempt to assert the
claim that this case deals with First Amendment issues, it should
once again be pointed out that the central issue in this case is
~

the abuse and exploitation of children through use of minors to
pose in the nude for the sexual arousal of any person (see Point I
of this brief; New York v. Ferber, supra). Thus, Piepenburg's
arguably more stringent standards for issuance of a warrant where
First Amendment issues are present

are inapplicable.

In this

case, as in any case where First Amendment issues are not present,
the standard for the establishment of probable cause is a
requirement of sufficient information to indicate that criminal
activity has occurred and that evidence of that criminal activity
will be found at the place to be searched.

Brinegar v. United

States, 338 U.S. 160 (1949); Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S.
523 (1967); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968).

Under that

standard, the affidavit underlying the search warrant was
sufficient.

Here, the detailed affidavit gave information from

which a reasonable magistrate could conclude that sexual
exploitation of a minor had occurred, and that evidence of such
would be found at the appellants' residence.

Under the accepted

Fourth Amendment standards for issuance of a search warrant, there
was no defect in the issuance of the warrant.
Alternatively, even if this case were analyzed within
the context of a First Amendment free speech case, the affidavit
here was sufficiently detailed to pass muster under Lee Art
Theatre, Inc. v. Virginia, supra, Utah Code Ann., § 76-10-1212(1)
(1953), as amended, and State v. Piepenburg, supra.
-41-
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The appellants' reliance on Lee Art Theatre, Inc. v.
Virginia, supra,

is misplaced.

There the United States Supreme

Court found insufficient the procedure followed by a justice of
the peace which allowed a search warrant to issue upon a police
officer's affidavit which stated the conclusory allegations that a
film sought to be seized was "obscene."
pro~dure

The court found this

did not allow the magistrate to "focus searchingly on

the question of obscenity," a standard the Court had previously
set out in Marcus v. Search Warrants of Property at 104 East
Tenth St., 367 U.S. 717 (1961).
Ann.,§ 76-10-1212(1}

If the requirements of Utah Code

(1953), as amended, are complied with, a

challenge under Lee Art Theatre cannot stana, the procedure found
objectionable by the United States Supreme Court being fully
avoided.
§

In the instant case, the requirements of Utah Code Ann.,

76-10-1212(1) {1953), as amended, were fully met.

That Section

provides:
(1) An affidavit for search warrant shall be filed
with the Magistrate describing with specificity the
material sought to be seized. Where practical, the
material alleged to be pornographic shall be
attached to the affidavit for search warrant so as
to affor~ the Magistrate the opportunity to examine
this material.
The appellants correctly cite the holding of Piepenburg, supra,
that where the affiant's affidavit is sufficiently detailed it is
not necessary that the magistrate personally view the material to
be seized.

Rather, the court stated that where the affidavit

gives sufficient information to allow the magistrate to
searchingly focus on the issue of obscenity, the issuance of the
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warrant will be upheld.

The respondent submits that the affidavit

in the instant case met the standara set forth in Piepenburg and
Lee Art Theatre.

The Piepenburg court, in adopting the standara

that required that the magistrate be able to "focus searchingly on
the question of obscenity," specifically referred to the Oklahoma
case of State v. Conaughty, Okl. Cr., 561 P.2d 554 (1977),

in

which that Court of Criminal Appeals held that an affidavit which
specified that a film viewed by the affiant was a "lewd and
obscene film" was insufficient.

The Oklahoma court held that:

A magistrate may find probable cause to issue a
warrant when an af fiant views a film and in his
affidavit or attendant testimony he factually
describes the film in detail [citations omitted].
The affidavit must simply allow the magistrate an
opportunity to "focus searchingly on the question of
obscenity" [citations omitted].
561 P.2d at 555 (emphasis added).
Sufficient detail is found in the affidavit at issue in
this case.

Here the affiant relates information from the

informant that is both factual and detailed,

i.e., that the

approximately 50 Polaroid snapshots shown him by the appellants
"showed Holly Wilkerson, Terry Fullmer, and Robert Jordan engaging
in, or simulating, sex acts"

(R. 4).

The affidavit goes on to

describe Holly Wilkerson's physical appearance, "approximately 15
years old, tall and redheaded."

The description and detail are

far from an objectionable, conclusory statement that the photos
were "obscene," such as that in Conaughty.
For all the legal standards set forth in the cases
regarding sufficient detail to withstand a challenge to the
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probable cause underlying the issuance of an affidavit, the
finding of sufficiency in this case is basically one of fact, one
that was resolvea in the State's favor in the court below. The
detail given in the affidavit from Officer Winn indicates that
even if this case were viewed as coming within the context of the
First Amendment, which it does not, such a finding was justified.

POINT VII
THE SEARCH WARRANT ADEQUATELY DESCRIBED THE
ITEMS TO BE SEIZED.
In Point V of their brief, the appellants assert two
arguments.

First, because the warrant itself was not sufficiently

specific in its description of the items to be seized, the
evidence taken under the warrant should have been suppressed.
Second, because unexposed film, a cloth sack and a television set
were seized, the broad execution of the warrant somehow rendered
the warrant's issuance invalid.
The affidavit underlying the search warrant, which gave
the magistrate sufficient probable cause to issue the warrant (See
Point VI, supra), indicated that the affiant was aware that his
confidential informant, "Gorgo," had been shown a stack of
approximately 50 Polaroid snapshots depicting Holly Wilkerson,
Terry Fullmer, and Robert Jordan engaging in or simulating sex
acts (R. 4, See Appendix "A").

Based upon this probable cause

finding by the magistrate, a search warrant was issued which
directed an immediate search of appellants'

residence:

-44-
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For the ~resence therein of child pornography, and
other evidence of sexual exploitation of a minor.
(R. 6, See Appendix "B").
3, f981,

The search was carried out on November

the same day the warrant was issued (R. 81, 6), and

several items of property were taken from the appellants'
residence.

1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
(R•

The inventory of property lists the following:
Assorted instant photographs,
Unexposed 35-MM film,
Flash Cubes,
Cloth Sack,
Unexposed Polaroid Film,
General Electric Color Television Set.

5 , A p pe nd i x " C" ) .
The appellants first argue that because the magistrate

authorized the seizure of "child pornography and other evidence of
sexual exploitation of a minor," without a specific definition of
"child pornography," this case is brought within the ruling of
Marcus v. Search Warrants, Propertv at 104 East Tenth Street,
-Kansas City, Missouri, 367 U.S. 717 (1961).

In so arguing, the

appellants once again muddy the issues by implying that First
Amendment issues of "obscenity" and "pornography," free speech and
free expression are involved.

Such is simply not the case (See

Point I, supra).
The magistrate's unfortunate use of the term "child
pornography," which is understandable in light of the pre-Ferber
interpretations of sexual exploitation statutes (See Point I,
supra), may, at first blush, be seen as invoking judgments by the
police that would have First Amendment implications.

Even though

-45-
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the magistrate's use of the term "child pornography" was included
within and considered by the magistrate to be a part of the larger
concept of "sexual exploitation of a minor," resort to First
Amendment considerations is still inappropriate.

The magistrate's

direction to search "for the presence of child pornography, and
other evidence of sexual exploitation of a minor" plainly
indicates the magistrate's intention that the search was to be
conducted primarily for any evidence of sexual exploitation of a
minor, regardless of whether such evidence was legally obscene or
not.

This direction is permissible and sufficient.
Evidence of sexual exploitation of a minor may or may

not be considered legally obscene (See Point VIII of this brief).
Thus, where the police are directed to search for evidence of
sexual exploitation of a minor, as in the instant case, the
officers'

focus in carrying out the search is not in determining

whether evidence of sexual exploitation is obscene, which
determination is arguably proscribed under Marcus, supra, but
rather is whether such evidence is relevant to the determination
of whether the crime alleged has been committed.

The

constitutional safeguards which due process demands in an
obscenity case, which assure that non-obscene material is not kept
from distribution, would be erroneously applied where they are
invoked solely to keep relevant non-obscene evidence from seizure
where obscenity is not at issue.

Nor is Lo-Ji Sales, Inc., v. New

York, 442 D.S. 319 (1979), cited by the appellants, controlling.
Not only

di~

that case deal with First Amendment issues, hut the
-46-
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holding was based on the insufficiency of the underlying affidavit
for the search warrant, as well as the sufficiency of an "openended" search warrant which was to be completed only after the
magistrate himself helped to carry out the search.

In the instant

case, none of the objectionable factors in Lo-Ji Sales is present
here.

Here, the affidavit underlying the warrant was sufficient

(See Point VI, supra), the warrant was not open-ended or to be
completed by the issuing magistrate, nor did the magistrate help
to carry out the search authorized by the warrant.

The

appellants' reliance on the language of the case is misplaced in
light of the fact that none of the factors leading to the United
States Supreme Court's decision in that case is present here.
Where there is no issue of First Amendment protections
for obscenity, or free speech, but rather where child abuse is at
issue, the fact that the executing officers were authorized to
determine whether evidence seized was evidence of child abuse, was
not objectionable.

The search warrant was sufficiently specific

under Fourth Amendment requirements.
In determining whether the objects of a search were
adequately described in a search warrant, the test is one of
reasonableness, and elaborate specificity is not required.

United

States v. Ventresca, 380 U.S. 102 (1965); United States v.
Freeman, 532 F.2d 1098, 1100 (7th Cir. 1976).

The degree of

specificity required when describing goods to be seized may
necessarily vary according to the circumstances and type of items
involved.

United States v. Davis, 542 F.2d 743 (8th Cir. 1976),
-47-
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cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1004 (1976).

Courts have upheld as

sufficiently specific search warrants which authorize the seizure
of "paraphernalia for making coins," United States v. Wilson, 451
F.2d 209 (5th Cir. 1971), cert. denied; Fairman v. United States,
405 U.S. 1032 (1971), "cooking utensils," State v. Walker, 202
Kan.

475, 449 P.2d 515 (1969), "various instruments and tools used

i n pe rf o rm i nq an abort ion, " state v . Brown , Kan. ,

4 7 0 P. 2 d 815

(1970), "narcotics, dangerous drugs, and narcotic paraphernalia,"
People v. Henry, Colo., 482 P.2d 357 (1971), and "any item in five
separate places relating to the death of an unknown individual
whose body had been found at described location," State v.
Ferrari, 80 N.M. 714, 460 P.2d 244 (1969).
Where, as here, the crime suspected involves child
abuse,

it has been held that the specificity requirements of a

search warrant, while they must comport with Fourth Amendment
standards, are somewhat less stringent than where other
considerations are involved.

In State v. Massev, Ore. App., 594

P.2d 1274 (1979), the court upheld a search warrant which
authorized a search "for evidence of the crimes of child abuse
and/or failure to send and maintain child at school."

The court

stated:
Here, there was a strong probability that a crime
involving danger to human life was underway and that
imminent action to prevent harm to human life was
warranted.
The means of committing that harm,
however, could not be known in advance of the
search.
In such a case, a general description with
a limitation is a reasonable way to proceed.
See
State v. Tidvman, 30 Ore. App. 537, 568 P.2d 666
review denied (1977).
The description in this
warrant, although broad, was sufficient to direct
the officers to search for the child and to limit
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their search to places and items relating to the
child.
The search for the child did not exceed that
purpose or that limitation.
We ao not recommend the
wrrant as a model of description but we hold it to
be constitutionally sufficient.
Id. at 1276.
In the instant case, while the affidavit underlying the
search warrant did not indicate that a crime involving danger to
human life was under way, there was sufficient indication that a
crime involving aanger to a minor's psychological well being, a
state interest which the Ferber court found to be as compelling as
the physical well being of a minor, 31 Cr.L.R. at 3142, was
underway.

Thus, using the Massey standards, the nature of the

crime itself rendered the warrant's specificity sufficient.
Certainly a warrant which authorizes the seizure of "child
pornography, and other evidence of sexual exploitation of a minor"
is as specific as that warrant in Massey which authorized a search
"for evidence of the crimes of child abuse, and/or failure to send
and maintain child at school."

Given the circumstances of this

case, the trial court's determination that the search warrant was
sufficiently specific was not error.
The appellants' second argument, that the broad
execution of the warrant rendered the warrant's issuance invalid,
constitutes "bootstrapping" and is without merit.

Despite the

appellants' assertion that:
it is difficult to imagine what relevance unexposed
film, a cloth sack and a television set would have
to do with child pornography or evidence of sexual
exploitation of a minor,
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and that "the seizure of 265 photographs, the majority of which do
not picture the minor at all, would appear to exceed even the
broad discretion set forth in the warrant" (see appellants' brief,
page 32), there are several theories under which the police could
validly seize those items, none of which would render the
warrant's issuance invalid.
unexposed Polaroid film,

It is probable that in seizing the

the 35-mrn film,

television set, the police

wer~

the cloth sack and the

validly exercising their

discretion within the "plain view" doctrine.

See Coolidge v. New

Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443 (1971); Harris v. United States, 390 U.S.
234 (1968); Recznik v. Loraine, 393 U.S. 166 (1968).

It is

possible that the police seized the items as "mere evidence" of
the crime.

See Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294 (1967), and

Andresen v. Maryland, 427 U.S. 463 (1976).

In either case,

seizure of the evidence would not mandate its suppression nor
render a sufficiently specific warrant invalid.

In the instant

case, however, regardless of the theory under which the items were
seized, the appellants have no grounds for complaint since none of
the items seized, with the exception of 30 photographs, was
introduced into evidence.
The appellants'

arqumen~

that the broad execution of a

warrant renders the warrant's issuance invalid is not supported by
case law.

In fact, the appellants'

implied argument that they

were somehow harmed in their trial by the seizure of evidence
which was never introduced against them falls of its own weight.
An argument that the broad execution of the

~arrant

is

indicative that the warrant itself was not sufficiently particular
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must also fail here.

While the rule in determining a warrant's

specificity is that the warrant's validity must be determined
without reference to actions taken under the warrant, it should be
pointed out that even if references to a warrant's execution were
permitted in determining the validity of the warrant's issuance,
the appellants in this case have conceded that the execution of
the warrant, through seizure of 265 photographs, appears to exceed
the discretion set forth in the warrant (See appellants' brief, p.
32).

Here, then, even were reference to a warrant's execution

allowed in determining the validity of a warrant's issuance, the
appellants have indicated that in the instant case such reference
is inappropriate.
Here, the search warrant was sufficiently specific to
pass muster under the constitutional requirements for search
warrants.

The trial court's ruling to that effect was not error.
POINT VIII
SINCE UTAH CODE ANN., § 76-10-1212(3) IS NOT
APPLICABLE TO THE INSTANT CASE, THERE WAS NO
ERROR BY THE TRIAL COURT IN NOT CARRYING OUT
ITS REQUIREMENTS.
The appellants argue,

in Point VI of their brief, that

error arose in the trial court's noncompliance with the provisions
of

Ut~

Code Ann., § 76-10-1212(3), which provides:
(3) In the event that a search warrant is issued and
material alleged to be pornographic is seizea under
the orovisions of this section, any person claiming
to b~ in possession of this material or claiming
ownership of it at the time of its seizure may file
a notice in writing with the magistrate within 10
-51-
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days after the date of the seizure, alleging that
the material is not pornographic.
The magistrate
shall set a hearing within seven days after the
filing of this notice, or at such other time as the
claimant might agree.
At this hearing evidence may
be presented as to whether there is prohable cause
to believe the material seized is pornographic, and
at the conclusion of the hearing the magistrate
shall make a further determination of whether
probable cause exists to believe that the material
is pornographic.
A decision as to whether there is
probable cause to believe the seized material is
pornographic shall be rendered by the court within
two days after the conclusion of the hearing.
If at
the hearing the magistrate finds that no probable
cause exists to believe that the material is
pornographic, then the material shall be returned to
the person or persons from whom it was seized.
If
the material seized is a film, and the claimant
demonstrates that no other copy of the film is
available to him, the court shall allow the film to
be copied at the claimant's expense pending the
hearing.
Notice of Claim that the Material Seized is Not Pornographic on
November 9, 1981 (R. 7), six days after the search of his
residence was carried out.

Other than the trial, no hearing to

decide whether the material was in fact pornographic was held.

It

is respondent's position that because First Amendment issues of
obscenitv and pornography are not applicable in determining the
appellants' guilt, compliance with the statute cited above to
determine whether the material seized was pornographic is
unnecessary and inappropriate.
As was pointed out in the appellants' brief, the Utah
statute at issue was provided for by the Legislature in order that
the requirements set out in the United States Supreme Court case
of Heller v. New York, 413 U.S. 483 (1973), be complied with.
Heller, the Supreme Court helo that where a prompt adversary
-52-
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In

hearing is afforded a defendant charged with obscenity violations
after seizure of allegedly obscene materials, no "prior restraint"
which violated the defendant's rights had occurred.
indicate, however, that in order to insure that

The court did

non-o~scene

materials were not restricted, a hearing on whether material
seized is pornographic should be held promptly after the seizure
if such had not been held prior to the seizure.
§

Utah Code Ann.,

76-10-1212(3) is a direct response, on the state level, to that

constitutionally mandated requirement of a prompt adversary
hearing enunciated in Heller.
The instant case is easily distinguishahle from the
Heller-type case which requires a hearing either before or
promptly after a seizure of material.

Where Heller dealt directly

with the violation of obscenity laws 1 the crime involved in this
case is the sexual abuse of minors, a crime unrelated to
-obscenity.

Where the purpose of the hearing requirements of

Heller, and the resulting Utah Code Ann., § 76-10-1212(3), are to
protect free speech and expression rights, no such purpose need or
can be served he re.
The necessity of aahering to a statute's requirements
must be seen in light of the statute's purpose and design.
Guinyard v. State, S.C., 195 S.E.2d 392, 395 (1973).

Where a

statute is inapplicable, or the purpose of the statute would not
be served by slavish adherence to its requirements, there is no
error in ignoring the statute's directions.

Such is the case

here.
-53-
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A judicial determination of whether the material seized
is pornographic would not resolve the issue of a defendant's guilt
of sexual exploitation, nor would it serve any other purpose.

If

the photographs were seized under a valid warrant, and were
otherwise admissible into evidence, there would have been no error
in so admitting them whether the evidence was obscene or not.
Thus, even if the evidence were found to be non-pornographic
through a hearing held under Utah Code Ann.,

§

76-10-1212(3), if

the evidence were otherwise relevant to determining the ultimate
issue of guilt, it could be used at trial.
Here, the question of whether the evidence of sexual
exploitation of a minor is pornographic bears no more relevance to
a determination of the guilt or innocence of the appellants than
would a question of whether evidence of a robbery or rape is
pornographic.

Surely the appellants would not insist that a

prompt post-seizure hearing be carried out where evidentiary
photographs of a rape are seized under a valid warrant.

Whether

such photographs are or are not legally obscene is irrelevant in
aetermining their probative value as evidence of a crime.

Such is

also the case here where, although the crime involved may be seen
as a "sex crime," obscenity is not at issue.
Characterizing this case as one involving free speech
issues, protections and safeguards is an attempt to fit a square
peg into an unyielding round hole.

Because free speech,

free

expression, and other First Amendment rights are not at issue
here, neither are statutorv

requireme~ts

set up to insure that

those rights are not violated.
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CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, respondent respectfully
submits that the decision of the trial court be affirmed.

Respectfully submitted this

/(,,-ft! day of September,

19 82.

DAVID L. WILKINSON
Attorney General

'-f'd~
EARL F .. DORIUS
Assistant Attorney General
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and exact copy of
the foregoing, postage prepaid, to Michael D. Esplin, 43 East 200
North, P .. O. Box "L," Provo, Utah, 84603, and W.. Andrew McCullough,
930 South State Street, Orem, Utah, 84057, Attorneys for
Appellants, this

/1J:i1

day of September, 1982.
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.1:::.d.~LJ.l..X

"A"

CIRCUIT COURT, OREM DEPARTMENT
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

STATE OF UTAH,

PETITION FOR AFFIDAVIT FOR

COUNTY OF UTAH.

SEARCH AND SEIZURE WARRANT

I, J. Stewart Winn, being first duly sworn on oath, depose and
say;
1.

That your affiant is a Police Officer employed by the City

of Orem and has been so employed for the past three years.
2.

That in that capacity on or about the 3rd day of November

1981, I received infonnation from a confidential infonnant, whose code
name is "Gorgo," that a quantity of nude photographs, corrmonly referred
to as child pornography" is being secreted at the address of 754 South
11

50 East, Orem, Utah County, Utah.

The pornography is in the possession

of Terry Fullmer, a white female and of.Robert Jordan, a black male.
The minor involved is a 15-year old female runaway, by the name of
Holly Wi 1kerson.
~Detective

Ralph Crabb has been involved in the investigation of

Holly Wilkerson as a runaway child.

The most recent runaway report

came in at 4:36 p.m. on October 31, 1981.

The evening of October 31,

1981, Detective Crabb met with W.G. Wilkerson, Holly's father, who
supplied him with a list of names, any of whom Holly could have been
staying with.

Two of the names on the list were Terry Fullmer and a

black named Robert Jordan.

Mr.

\~ilkerson's

information is that

Fullmer and Jordan are living together at 754 South 50 East, Orem,
Utah County, Utah.
4.

Holly

~~ilkerson

is still a runaway.

Confidential informant "Gorgo" visited Robert Jordan at

754 South 50 East, Orem, Utah County, Utah, on November l, 1981.
Terry Fullmer offered to sell "Gorgo" some stolen unexposed film.
11

Gorgo

11

asked what they used the film for.

They then showed him a
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stack of approximately fifty polaroid snapshots.

They all showed Holly

Wilkerson, Terry Fullmer, and Robert Jordan engaging in, or simulating
sex acts.

11

Gorgo

and redheaded.
Holly Wilkerson.

11

describes Holly as approximately 15-years old, tall

That matches the physical description of the runaway
11

Gorgo was told that they intend to sell the
11

photographs to "Penthouse Magazine."
5. Robert Jordan and Terry Fu11mer are living at 754 South 50
East, Orem, Utah County, Utah.
Harlow, their landlord.

This has been verified through Walls

754 South 50 East, Orem, Utah County, Utah,

is further described as a red, brick four-plex on the west side of
50 East street at 754 South, and is the south apartment on the second
level with the numbers 754 next to the door.
6.

The materials sought by this application for a search

warrant are being held in violation of the Utah Criminal Code and are
evidence of sexual exploitation of a minor.

Wherefore, I respectfully

request that this court issue its warrant for the search at any time of
the day the south apartment on the upper level of 754 South 50 East,
Orem, Utah County, Utah, for the presence therein of child pornography
and other evidence of sexual exploitation of a minor.
7.

The above-mentioned informant has proven reliable

in the past assisting this department in numerous narcotic
operations now pending prosecution.

~-~~~
A F F I A NT

Subscribed and sworn to before this <_3""{ day of November, 1981

~~---
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"B"

CIRCUIT COURT, OREM DEPARTMENT
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

SEARCH WARRANT

THE STATE OF UTAH TO: J. Stewart Winn, OREM CITY POLICE DEPARTMENT, and
to any other peace officer in Utah County in assistance:
Proof by affidavit having been made before me this

~~-day

of November, 1981, that there is probable and reasonable cause to
believe that there is presently located in the following described
premises the property set forth below;
NOW, THEREFORE YOU AND EACH OF YOU are hereby directed to
conduct an irrr.iediate search during the daylight hours of an apartment
on the south side of the upper level of a red, brick four-plex, further
identifieG by the number 754 by the door, said apartment being located
at 754 South 50 East Street, Orem, Utah County, Utah, for the presence
therein of child pornography, and other evidence of sexual exploitation
of a minor.

If you find the same, you are directed to bring it forth-

with before me at the above Court or hold the same in your possession
pending further order of this Court.
Date this

3 rJ...

day of November, 1981.

THIS WARRANT SHALL EXECUTE WITHIN TEN DAYS OF THE DATE OF ITS ISSUANCE.
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APPENDIX "C"

STATE OF UTAH
COUNTY OF UTAH
INVENTORY of property taken from the residence of Robert Jordan
and Terry Fullmer, located at 754 South 50 East,Orem, Utah County, Utah
by authority of the Search Warrant issued by Robert J·. Sumsion, Judge,
8th Circuit Court, Orem, County of Utah, dated November 3, 1981.
1.

Assorted Instant Photographs

2.

Unexposed 35rrm Film

3.

Flash Cubes

4.

Cloth Sack

5.

Unexposed Polaroid Film

6.

General Electric Color Television Set

I, J. Peter Hansen, the officer by whom this warrant was executed,
do swear that the above inventory contains a true and detailed statement
of all property taken by me on the said warrant.

Subscribed and sworn to before me this ~day of November, 1981.

STATE OF UTAH

cournv OF u1.ci.H
hereby certify that I have served the warrant and have the
property described therein in the Orem Police Department Evidence Room
and have the goods detailed in the inventory endorsed hereon in Court.
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"l)"

NOALL T. WOOTTON
Utah County Attorney
Room 107, County Building
Provo, .Utah
84601
OREM
________
_ _ _ _ _ _DEPARTMENT
EIGHTH CIRCUIT COURT, UTAH COUNTY
FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT, STATE OF UTAH

---------------------------------------------------------------------STATE OF UTAH,

Plaintiff,
-vs-

:

ROBERT JORDAN, JR.,
TERRY L. FULL.MER,
Defendant(s).

INFORMA-TION

Criminal No.

3 .2 "2.

---------------------------------------~------------------------------

The undersigned
PETE HANSEN
under oath
states on information and belief that the defendant(s) committed the
crime(s) of:
SEXUAL EXPLOITATION OF A MINOR, a Second Degree
~~¥.l~IS:

Felony, at Utah County, Utah, on or about Ns¥sRl:Ber ~,
1981, in violation

'

ot' 76-10-1206.5, Utah Criminal Code,

as amended, in that they, at the time and place aforesaid,
knowingly and intentionally used, persuaded, induced~ (J?,...
enticed Holly Wilkerson, a minor, to pose in the nude while
simulating sexual conduct for th~ purpose of .photographing,
filming 1 recording, .or displaying sexual or simulated sexual
conduct.

Thi~ information is based on evidence obtained from the
following witnesses:
Pete Hansen

County Attorney

Subscribed and sworn ~9 before r.;a
this
4* day of f!'M_eV
, 1911-
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TheCRIMINAL

EXTRA EDmON NO. 1

Text Section

~ LAW REPORTER®
THE BUREAU OF NA TIOMAL AFFAIRS, INC.

Volume 31, No. 13

OPINIONS OF THE UNITED ST AT.ES
SUPREME COURT
NEW YORK '· FERBER. No. 81-55
FIRST AMENDMENT .. 254.70 - A New York c:ri.miaJ
statwte taat, in order to ptt¥ent d:te sexual expk>itatioR ud abme
or cWktren, prohibits penoDS from bowi.ngly proclucing, directmi. or ~ material daat Tisually depicts sexual CODduct by
cWktree aader 16, repnl1ess of wbetber such material is obsceee,
is 90t sabstantially ~erbroad and does DOt tiolate tt.e FtrSt
A.mendmetrt; child poraograpby, like obscenity, is unprotected by
die First AIDeDdmeat., ud diius material containing risuaJ depictions of specified sexual conduct by children below a specific a,e
-Y be proscribed "'en if the material does aot appeal to tae
pnrient illterest of the Hentp person and the sexual coed.act is
IOt portrayed ia. ,.tatdy otfemi.e llWIDer.

wbich ~ IDc:b a performanee. Tbe ltatUte defines "'6wLI performance" u 111y performance that includes eexual conduct by such a child,
and ..leXUa} conciuc:t" ia in tam defined U actual OT Kimulated NXUal intercounle, deviate llexua1 im.ercoune, leXU&l bestiality I muturb&tion,
uOo-muochiltic &bu.le, or ~exhibition of the ~- Respondent
bookstore proprietor WU COBvieted under' the statute for eelling filma depctmr young boys muturbating, and the Appellate Division of the New
Yark Suprene Court atfi:rmed. The New Yark Court of Appeal.a reftl'Wi, holding that the statute violated the First Amencbnent u being
both u.nderincluaive and ~- Tbe eoart reuoned that in light of
the explicit inclusion of an obeeenity lt&Ddard in a companion statute
banning the ~ di,uemjnarion of similarly deftDed material, the
atatute in question could DOt be COllStl'ued to iDdude an obtcenity stand.
ard, and tberefon would probibtt the ):lftJmOtion of material.a tnditionally entitied to protection under the First Amendment.
Bel.ti· Al. applied to respaodmt md d:hen who distribute limilaT material,
the statUte in question does DOt. violate the First Amendmem
applied
to the States through the Fourteenth Amendment.
(a) The States are entitled to greater leeway in the regulation of pornographic depictions of chi1dl"en for the following reaaon.a: Cl) the legislative judgment that the uae ol children u subjeets of pornographic ma·
terial.e is harmtul to to ~ emotional. and mental health of the
c:hild, easily pweg aiuster unde?" the First A mendtnent; (2) the st.andm-cl
of Miller v. Ca.J.ifonc.ia, U3 U. S. 15, fer determining what i& leg&lly ~
~ ia not.~ ~ution to the child pornography problem; (3)
the adverti&ing and loelling of chiki pornography provide& an economic
motive for and ia tbm an int.eg:n.1 part of the JrOCiucticm of such materials, an aetivity illepl througbout the Nation; (4) the value of permitting
Im performances and pbotognphic ~of children enpged ill
lewd uhibitiom ia exceedingly modest, if not dL. minim16; and (5) recognizing and ciusifying child pamoeraphy u a catagory of material outllide the First Amendment's pr.otec:tion is not incompatible with um
c.ourt'a dec:iaiom dealin( wtth W'hat speech is l.Dlproteeted. When a detmabie claaa of materi&1. such u that covered by the New York statllte,
bean IO heavily and pe?'\'&IQvely Oil the welfare of children enpred in it.a
product.ion, the balance of competing interest.a jg clearly struck, and it iB
permiaaible to COMide:?- ~ materWa .. without the First Amendment's protection.
(b) The New Yark atar.ut.e dellCribel a eaterm"Y of material the production and distribution rl which is not entitled to First Amendment prot.ection. A.ccord:i.n¢y. there is nothing unccm.rtitutionally "underinclusin" about the statute, and the Su.t.e ia not ba.rTed by the Finn
Amendment from prohibiting the di&tribution of such unprotected materiall produced out.aide the State.
.
(c) Nor ia the New Ycri. ll:t&tUU ~ over-broad u for·
~ the clist:ribution of ID&teri.al with leriou.a literary, scientiiiC, or
~ value.
Tb! .w:.witial overtreath rule of B~ v.
OCloJwmi4, .&13 U. S. 6(i, applieL Tma i& the ~ cue of a
state statute wbme ~ !ecb dwarb n. arguably impermiaai~

»

Full

T~xt

of Opinion

No. 81-66

NEWYOR~

PETITIONER v. PAUL IRA FERBER

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE COURT OF APPEALS
OF NEW YORK
Syllabua

~ve- overlradth m.ta sboWd ~ elll"ed thJ"oug:h
~-cue ma1yD of the fact ~ to which [the statute's) ~
tiam, UM!l"tedly. may~ applied.. ~ v. o~. nq:wu, at

mpplicatiom

No. 81-66. Arped April Z'l, 1982-Decided July 1. 1982

A N~ Yerk atatute prohibit.a penom from lmowingiy promoting a Bern.I
performance by a ebild under the are of 16 by distributing material
NOTICE.: That opinions ue .,b,;eet to formal revmon befo~ public>liOll in the prdimin&ry print of the United States Reporu. Readers an:
req1&11&d to notify the kcporter of Deciaons., Supreme Court of the
Untted Statei, fliuhinrtoc. D.C. 20543, of any typograpb.K:a.l or other
formal erron, iri onic:r that ccmecDoru may be made before the prelimtnary print goes tt> prea.

c

61Ml6.
52 N.Y. 2d 674.,

m

N.E. 2d 523, ~and remanded.

NOTE: Where it ii deemed desintK, a syllabus {beMi:Potc) will be
reS:ued • • • at 1he time the opinion is ~ Tbe ryllab1u comtituta
pc1 of the opJnjcxi of the Court bot bas been prepared by the
Jl.eportc- of Deciliom for the coo-uence of the reader. Sec Urriud Sma

DO

I'. ~t10i1

UJmMr Co., 200 U.S. 321. 337.

Copynght
by for
The
Bureau provided
of National
At'taJr&,
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney
Law Library.1982
Funding
digitization
by the
InstituteInc.
of Museum and Library Services
0011·13'1/82/I00.50
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

WHITE. J. 1 delivered the opinion of the Court, in which BURGER, C. J.,
and POWELL. REHNQl,1ST, and O'CONNOR, JJ., joined. O'CONNOR, J.,
filed a eoncuni.ng opinion. BRENN AN, J., filed an opinion concurring in
th"' judgment, in which MARsHALL, J., joined. BLACKMUS, J., concurred
in the result. STEVENS, J., filed an opinion concurring in the judgment.

JUSTICE WHITE delivered the opinion of the Court.

At issue in this case is th constitutionality of a New York
criminal statute which prohibits persons from knowingly promoting sexual performances by children under the age of 16
by distributing material which depicts such performances.

I
In recent years, the exploitive use of children in the production of pornography has become a serious national prol>lem.1 The federal government and forty-seven States have
sought to combat the problem with statutes specifically directed at the production of child pornography. At least half
of such statutes do not require that the materials produced be
legally obscene. Thirty-five States. and the United States
Congi-ess have also passed legislation prohibiting the distribution of such materials; twenty States prohibit the distribution of material depicting children engaged in sexual conduct
v.ithout requiring that the material be legally obscene. 2

'"Child pornography and child prostitution have become highly orga-

nized, multimillion dollar industries that operate on a nationwide scale." S.
Rep. No. 95-438, p. 5 (1978). One researcher has documented the existenee of over 260 different magazines which depict children engaging in
sexually explicit conduct. Ibid. "Such magazines depict children, some
as young as three to five years of age . . . The activities featured range
from lewd poses to intercourse, fellatio, cunnilingus, masturbation, rape,
inl:'est and sado-m.asochism." Id., at 6. In Los Angeles alone. police reported that 30,000 children have been sexually exploited. Sexual Exploitation of Children, Hearings before the Subcommittee on Select Education
of the House Comm. on Ed. and Labor, 95th Cong., 1st ~ss .. 41-42 (1977).
2
In addition to New York, nineteen Statei; have prohibited the dissemination of material depicting children engaged in sexUAJ conduct regardless
of whether the material is obscene. Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § l~
<Supp. 1981); Colo. Rev. Stat. § 18-6-403 (Supp. 1981); Del. Code Ann.,
Tit. 11, § § 1108, 1109 0979); Fla. Stat. § 847.014 (1976); Haw. Rev. Stat.
§ 707-751 <Supp. 1981); Ky. Rev. Stat.§§ 531.320, 531.340-531.360 0980);
La. Rev. Stat. § 14:81.l(A)(3) <West Supp. 1982); Mass. Gen. Laws Ann.,
ch. 272, § 29A (West Supp. 1982); Mich. Comp. Laws § 750.145c(3) (1982);
Miss. Code Ann. § 97-5-33(4) (Supp. 1981); Mont. Code Ann. § 45-5-625
0981); N. J. Stat. Ann. §2C:24-4(b)(5) (West 1981); Okla. Stat., Tit. 21,
§ 1021.2 (Supp. 1981-1982); Pa. Com. Stat. § 6312(c) (1982): R. I. Gen.
Laws § 11-9-1.l (1981); Tex. Penal Code Ann. Tit. 9, § 43.25 (1982); Utah
Code Ann. § 7~10-1206.5(3) (Supp. 1981); W. Va. Code§ 61-SC-3 (Supp.
1981 ); Wis. Stat. § 940.203(4) (West) (Supp. 1981-1982).
FL"teen States prohibit the dissemination of such material only if it is obscene. Ala. Code § 13-7-231, 13-7-232 (Supp. 1981); Ark. Stat. Ann.
§ 41-4201 <Supp. 1981); Cal. Penal Code Ann. § 3ll.2(b) (1970) (general ob5-cenitv statute); Ill. Stat. ch. 38. § ll-20a(b)(l) (1979); lnci. Code
§ ~10.1-2 (1979); Me. Rev. Stat. Ann., Tit. 17, § 2923(1) (Supp.
l"Si-1982): Minn. Stat. §617.246(3) and (4) <Supp. 1982); Neb. Rev. Stat.
§ 28-1463(2) 0979); N. H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 650:2(!!) (Supp. 1981); N. D.
Cent. Code § 12.1-27.1-01 (1976) (general obscenity statute); Ohio Rev.
Code Ann. §2907.32l(A) 0982); Ore. Rev. Stat. §163.485 (1981); S. D.
Comp. Laws Ann. § § 22-22-24, 22-22-25 0979); Tenn. Code Ann.
§ 39-1020 (1981); Wash. Rev. Code § 9.68A.030 (1981). The federal statUlf:' also prohibits dissemination only if the material is obscene.
18
V. S. C. § 2252(a) (1976 Supp. IV). Two States prohibit dissemination
only if the material is obsce;1e as to minors. Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann.
§ 53a-196b (Supp. 1982); Va. Code§ 18.2-374.l 0982).
Tvvelve State~ prohibit only the use of minors in the production of the
material. Ala.ska Stat. Ann. § 11.41.455 (1981); Ga. Code § 2&-9943(a)
(Supp. 1981); Idaho Code§ 44-1306 (1979); Iowa Code§ 728.12 (1979): Kan.
S:.at. Ann. § 21-3516 (1981 ); Md. Crim. Law Code Ann. § 419A (Supp.
1981); Mo. Rev. Stat. § 568.060<l)(b) 0979); Nev. Rev. Stat. § 200.509
(1981); ~. M. Stat. Ann. §30-6-10980); N. C. Gen. Stat.§ 1~190.60981);
S. C. Code§ 1~15-380 (1981); Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 14-3-102(a)(v)(E) (19i7).

New -~···
v1. ..... "" ...... cui...r.
u1J..'711, 1.ne .New York
legislature enacted Article 263 of its Penal Law. Section
263. 05 criminalizes as a class C felony the use of a child in a
sexual performance:
M;t

"'.,"

"A person is guilty of the use of a child in a sexual per.
formance if 1mowing the character and content thereof
he employs, authorizes or induces a child less than sixteen years of age to engage in a sexual performance or
being a parent, legal guardian OT custodian of such child
he consents to the participation by such child in a sexuai
performance."

A "sexual performance is defined as 'any performance or part
thereof which includes sexual conduct by a child less than sixteen years of age,'" §26?.l. "Sexual conduct" is in turn de-.
fined in § 263.3:
" 'Sexual conduct' means actual or simulated sexual in·
tercourse, de\'iate sexual intercourse, sexual bestiality,
masturbation, sado-masochistic abuse, or lewd exhibition of the genitals."

A performance is defined as "any play, motion picture, photograph or dance" OT "any other visual presentation exhibited
before an audience." § 263.4
At issue in this case is § 263.15, defining a class D felony:3
"A person is guilty of promoting a sexual perfonnance
by a child when, knowing the character and content
thereof, he produces, directs or promotes any performance which includes sexual conduct by a child less than
sixteen years of age."

...:

~··

To "promote" is also defined:
"'Promote' means to procure, manufacture, issue, sell.
give, provide, lend, mail, deliver. transfer, transmute,
publish, distribute, circulate, disseminate, present, exhibit or advertise, or to offer or agree to do the same."

A companion provision bans only the lmowing dissemination
of obscene material. § 263.10.
This case arose when Paul Ferber, the proprietor of a Man·
hattan bookstore specializing in sexually oriented products,
sold two films to an undercover police officer. The films are
devoted almost exclusively to depicting young boys mastur·
bating. Ferber was indicted on two counts of§ 263.10 and
two counts of §263.15, the two New York laws controlling
dissemination of child pornography.' After a jury trial, Ferber was acquitted of the two counts of promoting an obscene
sexual performance, but found guilty of the two counts under
§ 263.15, which did not require proof that the films were obscene. Ferber's convictions were affirmed v.ithout opinion
by the Appellate Division of the New York State Supreme
Court. 72 A.D. 2d, 558, 42.f K.Y.S. 2d, 967.
The New York Court of Appeals reversed, holding that
§263.15 violated the First Amendment. 52 N.Y. 2d, 6i4,
422 N.E. 2d, 523 (1981). The court began by noting that in
light of § 263. lO's explicit inclusion of an obscenity standard,
§ 263.15 could not be construed to include such a standard.
Therefore, "the statute would . . . prohibit the promotion of
materials which are traditionally entitled to constitutional

i Class D felonies carry a maximum punishment for up to seven yeJJ"S as
to individuals, and as to corporatioru a fine of up to Sl0.000. N.Y. Penal
Law §§ 70.00, 80.10. Respondent Ferber was sent.enced to 45 days in

orison.
•The trial judge rejected Ferber's Fi.""St Amendment attack on the two
sect.ions in denying a motion to dismiss the i.ndicunent. 96 Misc. 2d 669,
409 N. Y.S. 2d 632 (1978).
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protection from government interference under the First
Amendment." 52 N.Y. 2d at 678, 422 N.E. 2d at 525. Although the court recognized the State's "legitimate interest
in protecting the welfare of minors" and noted that this "interest may transcend First Amendment concerns," 52 N. Y.
2d at 679, 422 N .E. 2d at 526, it nevertheless found two fatal
defects in the New York statute. Section 263.15 was
underinclusive because it discriminated against visual portrayals of children engaged in sexual activity by not also
prohibiting the distribution of films of other dangerous activity. It was also overbroad because it prohibited the distribution of materials produced outside the State, as well as materials, such as medical books and educational sources, which
"deal with adolescent sex in a realistic but nonobscene manner." 52 N.Y. 2d at 681, 422 N.E. 2d at 526. Two judges
dissented. We granted the State's petition for certiorari,
U. S. - - (1981), presenting the single question:
"To prevent the abuse of children who are made to engage in sexual conduct for commercial purposes, could
the New York State Legislature, consistent with the
First Amendment, prohibit the dissemination of material
which shows children engaged in sexual conduct, regardless of whether such material is obscene?"

II
The Court of Appeals proceeded on the assumption that
the standard of obscenity incorporated in §263.10, which follows the guidelines enunciated in Miller v. California, 413
U. S. 15 (1973)," constitutes the appropriate line dividing
protected from unprotected expression by which to measure
a regulation directed at child pornography. It was on the
premise that ''nonobscene adolescent sex" could not be singled out for special treatment that the court found § 263.15
"strikingly underinclusive." Moreover, the assumption that
the constitutionally permissible regulation of pornography
could not be more extensive with respect to the distribution
of material depicting children may also have led the court to
conclude that a narrowing construction of § 263.15 was
·unavailable.
The Court of Appeals' assumption was not unreasonable in
light of our decisions. This case, however, constitutes our
first examination of a statute directed at and limited to depictions of sexual activity involving children. We believe our
inquiry should begin with the question of whether a State has
somewhat more freedom in proscribing works which portray
sexual acts or lewd exhibitions of genitalia by children.
A

In Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U. S. 568 (1942),
the Court laid the foundation for the excision of obscenitv
from the realm of constitutionally protected expression:
•
"There are certain well-defined and narrowly limited
classes of speech, the prevention and punishment of
which have never been thought to raise any Constitutional problem. These include the lewd and obscene . . .
It has been well observed that such utterances are no essential part of any exposition of ideas and are of such
slight social value as a step to truth that any benefit that
may be derived from them is clearly outweighed by the
social interest and morality.... "Id., at 571-572.
Embracing this judgment, the Court squarely held in Roth
v. United States, 354 U. S. 476 (1957), that ''obscenity is not

'New York Penal Law §235.00 (1) (1980); People v. Illardo, 48 :S.Y. 2d
408. 415 and n. 3; 399 N .E. 2d 59, 62-63 and n. 3 09i9).

6-30-82

'Within the area of constitutionally protected speech or press."

!d.• at 485.

The Court recognized that "rejection of obscensocial importance" was implicit m the history of the First Amendment: The original
states .Provided for the prosecution of libel, blasphemy and
profaruty and the ''universal judgment that obscenity should
be restrained [is) refiected in the international agreement of
over 50 nations, in the obscenity laws of all of the 48 states
and in the 20 obscenity laws enacted by Congress from
to 1956." Ibid.
Roth was followed by fifteen years ·during which this Court
struggled with "the intractable obscenity problem." Interstate Circuit, Inc. v. Dallas, 390 U. S. 676, 704 (1968) (Harlan, J.). See, e. g., Redru.p v. New York, 386 U. S. 767
(1967). Despite considerable vacillation over the proper definition of obscenity, a majority of the members of the Court
remained firm in the position that ''the States have a legitimate interest in prohibiting dissemination or exhibition of obscene material when the mode of dissemination carries with it
a significant danger of offending the sensibilities of unwilling
recipients or of exposure to juveniles." Miller v. California,
413 U. S., at 19; Stanley v. Georgi.a., 394 U. S. 557, 567
(1969); Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629, 637-643 (1968);
Interstate Circuit, Inc. v. Dallas, supra., at 690; Red.rup v.
New York, supra, at 769; Jacobelli8 v. Ohio, 378 U. S. 184,

1t~ ~.utterly without redeeming

i842

195 (1964).

Throughout this period, we recognized "the inherent dangers of undertaking to regulate any form of expression."
Miller v. California, 413 U. S., at 23. Consequently, our difficulty was not only to assure that statutes designed to regulate obscene materials sufficiently defined what was prohibited, but to devise substantive limits on what fell within the
permissible scope of regulation. In Miller v. California,
supra., a majority of the Court agreed that "a state offense
must also be limited to works which, taken as a whole, appeal
to the prurient interest in sex, which port.ray sexual conduct
in a patently offensive way, and which, taken as a whole, do
not have serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific
value." 413 U. S., at 24. Over the past decade, we have
adhered to the guidelines expressed in Miller, 6 which subsequently has been followed in the regulatory schemes of most
states. 7

1
Ha.mling v. United Sta.tu, 418 U. S. 87 (1974); Jenkim v. Georgia, 418
U. S. 153 (1974); Ward v. Illifi.OU, 431 U. S. 767 (1977); Marks v. United
Sta.tes. 430 U. S. 188 0977); Pinku.8 v. United States, 436 U. S. 293 (1978).
'Thirty-seven State5 and the District of Columbia have either legisla·
tive!y adopted or judicially incorporated the Miller test for obseenity.
Ala. Code § 13A-l2-150 (Supp. 1981); Am.. Rev. StaL Ann. § 13-3501C2)
(1978); Ark. Stat. Ann. § 41-3502(6) (Supp. 1981); Colo. Rev. Stat.
§ l~ i-101(2) (Supp. 1981 ): Del. Code Ann., Tit. 11, § 1364 <Supp. 1981);
Lakin v. United Stat.es, 363 A. 2d 990 COCCA 1976); Ga. Code § 2~210Hb)
0978); Haw. Rev. Stat. § il2-1210<6) (Supp. 1981); ldaho Code
§ l8-4101(A) (1979); Iowa Code § 228.4 (1979) (only child pornography covered); Ind. Code § 3&-30-10.1-l(c} (1979); Kan. St.aL Ann. § 21-4301 (2)(a)
(1981); Ky. Rev. Stat. § 531.010(3) (1975); La. Rev. St.at. U4:106(A){2) &
(A){3) (West Supp. 1982): Ebert v. Md. St. Bd ofCt:n.8<m, 19 Md. App. 300,
316 A. 2d 536 (1974); Mus. Gen. Laws Ann., ch. 272, § 31 (West Supp.
1982); People v. Neu:mo.yer, 405 Mich. 341, 275 N. W. 2d 230 (1979); Sta.t.e
v. Welke, 298 Minn. 40'l, 216 N. W. 2d 641 (1974); Mo. Rev. Stat.
§ 5i3.010{1) (1979); Neb. Rev. Stat., § 28-807(9) (1979); Nev. Rev. Stat.
§ 201.235 (1981); N. H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 650:l(IV) (Supp. 1981); N. J.
Stat. Ann. § 2C:34-2 (\Vest Supp. 1981); N. Y. Penal Law § 235.00(1)
(1980); N. C. Gen. Stat. § 14-l~l(b) (1981); K D. Cent. Code
§ 12.l-27.1-Ql(4) (1976); Sta.le v. Burgun, 56 Ohio St. 2d 354. 384 K. E. 2d
255 (Ohio 1978): McCrory v. State, 533 P. 2d 629 <Okla. Crim App. 1974);
Ore. Rev. Stat. § 16i.08i(2) 0981); 18 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 5903Cbl 0982); R.
I. Gen. Laws § 11-31-1 (1981); S. C. Code § 16-1~260\a) 0981); S. D.
Comp. Laws Ann. § 22-24-27(10) (19i9); Tenn. Code Ann. ~ 39-300107)
(1981); Tex.as Penal Code Ann. § 43.2l(a) (1982); t.:tah Code Ann.
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The Miller standard, like its predecessors, was an accommodation between the state's interests in protecting the
"sensibilities of unwilling recipients" from exposure to pornographic material and the dangers of censorship inherent in
unabashedly content-based laws. Like obscenity statutes,
laws directed at the dissemination of child pornography run
the risk of suppressing protected expression by allowing the
hand of the censor to become unduly heavy. For the following :reasons, however, we are persuaded that the States are
entitled to greater leeway in the regulation of pornographic
depictions of children.
First. It is evident beyond the need for elaboration that a
state's interest in "safeguarding the physical and psychological well being of a minor" is "compelling." Globe Newspapers
v. Superior Court, U.S.-, (1982). "A democratic society rests, for its continuance, upon the healthy
well-rounded growth of young people into full maturity as citizens." Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U. S. 158, 168 (1944).
Accordingly, we have sustained legislation aimed at protecting the physical and emotional well-being of youth even when
the laws have operated in the sensitive area of constitutionally protected rights. In Prince v. Massachusetts, supra,
the Court held that a statute prohibiting use of a child to dis-tribute literature on the street was valid notwithstanding the
statute's effect on a First Amendment activity. In Ginsberg
'"New York, 390 U. S. 629 (1968), we sustained a New York
law protecting children from exposure to nonobscene literature. Most recently, we held that the government's interest
in the "well-being of its youth" justified special treatment of
indecent broadcasting received by adults as well as children.
FCC v. Pacifica Foundation, 438 U. S. 726 (1978).
The prevention of sexual exploitation and abuse of children
constitutes ·a government objective of surpassing importance. The legislative findings accompanying passage of the
New York laws reflect this concern:
"There has been a proliferation of children as subjects in
sexual performances. The care of children is a sacred
trust and should not be abused by those who seek to
profit through a commercial network based on the
exploitation of children. The public policy of the state
demands the protection of children from exploitation
through sexual performances." Laws of N. Y., 1977, ch.
910,§1. 8

§ 7&-1~1203(1) (1978); Va. Code § 18.2-372 (1982); 1982 Wash. La~rs .. Ch.
184, § 1(2).
Four States continue to follow the test approved in Memoi.n v. Massachusetts, 383 U. S. 413 (1966). Cali!. Penal Code Ann. § 3ll(a) (Supp.
1982); Conn. Gen. Stat. § 53a-1S.3 (Supp. 1982); Fla. Stat. § 847.07 (1976);
Ill. Rev. Stat. ch. 38, § ll-2CKb) (1979). Five States regulate only the distribution of pornographic mater"ial to minors. Me. Rev. Stat. A:m., Tit.
l i. § 2911 (Supp. 1981-82J; Mont. Code Ann. ~ 45-8-201 0981); N. M. Stat.
.A.nn. § 30-37-2 (1980); Vt. Stat. Ann., Tit. 13, § 2802 (1981); W. Va. Code,
§ 61-8A-2 (1977). Three State obscenity laws do not fall into any of the
above categories. Miss. Code Ann. § 97-29-33 (l9i3), declared invalid in
ABC Interstate Th«zt:res, Inc. v. State, 32.5 So. 2d 123 (Miss. 1976); Wisc.
St.at. § 944.2l(l)(a) (1977), declared invalid in State v. Pri.ncess Cinema of
Milwaukee, Inc., 96 Wis. 2d 646, 292 N. W. 2d 807 (1980); Wyo. Stat.
§ 6-5-303 (1977.) Alaaka has no current state obscenity law.
A number of States employ a different obscenity standard with respect
to material distributed to children. See, e.g., Fla. Stat.§ 847.0125 (1976).
' In addition, the legislature found:
"mhe sale of these movies, ma.gaz:ines, and photographs depicting the sexual conduct of children to be so abhorrent to the fabric of our society that it
urges law enforcement officers to aggressively seek out and prosecute both
the peddlers of this filth by vigorously apply'ing the sanctions contained in
this act." Law of N.Y., 1977, ch. 910, ~ 1.

We
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spondent has not intimated that we do so. Suffice it to sa)
that virtually all of the States and the United States havE
passed legislation proscribing the production of or otherwise
combatting "child pornography." The legislative judgment,
as well as the judgment found in the relevant literature, is
that the use of children as subjects of pornographic materials
iE harmful to the physiological, emotional, and mental health
of the child. v That judgment, we think, easily passes muster under the First Amendment.
Second. The distribution of photographs and films depicting sexual activity by juveniles is intrinsically related to the
sexual abuse of children in at least two ways. First, the materials produced are a permanent record of the children's par.
ticipation and the harm to the child is exacerbated by their
circulation. 10 Second, the distribution network for child pornography must be closed if the production of material which
requires the sexual exploitation of children is to be effectively

• "The use of children as . • . subjects of pornographic materials is very
harmful to both the children and the society as a whole." S. Rep. No.
95-438, p. 5 (1978). It has been found that sexually exploited childl'en are
unable to develop healthy affectionate relationships in later life, have sexual dysfunctions, and have a tendency to become sexual abusers as adults.
Schoettle, Child Exploitation: A Study of Child Pornography, 19 J. Am.
Acad. Child Psych. 289, 296 (1980) (hereafter cited as Child Exploitation);
Schoettle, Treatment of the Child Pornography Patient, 137 Am. J. Psych.
1109, 1110 (1980); Densen-Gerner, Child Prostitution and Child Pornography: Medical, Legal and Societal Aspects of the Commercial Exploitation
of Children, reprinted in U. S. Dept. of Health and Human Services. Sex·
ual Abuse of Children: Selected Readings at 80 (1980) <hereafter cited as
Commercial Exploit.ation) (sexually exploited children predisposed to self·
destructive beha>ior such as drug and alcohol abuse or prostitution). See
generally A. Burgess & L Holmstrom, Aeeessory-t<rSex: Pressure, Sex
and Secrecy, in Burgess, Sexual Assault of Children and Adolsecents BS,
94 (1978); V. De Francis, Protecting the Child Victim of Sex Crimes Committed by Adults, 169 (1969): Ellerstein & Canavan, Sexual Abuse of Boys,
134 Arn. J. Diseases of Children 255, 256-257 (1980); Finch, Adult Seduction of the Child: Effects on the Child, 7 Med. Aspects of Human Sexuality
170, 185 (1973); Groth, Sexual Traum.a in the Life Histories of Rapists and
Child Molesters, 4 Victimology 10 0979). Sexual molestation by adults is
often involved in the production of child sexual performances. SeXUil
Exploitation of Children. A Report to Illinois General Assembly by the Illi·
nois Legislative Investigatory Comm'n at 30-31 (1980) (hereafter cited as
Ill. Comm'n). 'Wben such performances are recorded and distributed. the
child's privacy interests are also invaded. See n. 10, infra..
10
As one authority has explained:
"Pornography poses an even greater t.Ve&t to the child victim than does
sexual abuse of prostitution. Because the child's actions are reduced to a
recording, the pornography may haunt him in future years, long after the
original misdeed took place. A child who has posed for the camera must
go through life knowing t:Mt the recording is circulating within the mass
distribution system for child pornograp~y." Shouvlin. Preventing the
Sexual Exploitation of Children: A Model Act, li Wake Forest L. Rev.
535, 545 (1981)
.
See also Schoettle, Child Exploitation. at 292 Cil)t is the fear of exposure
and the tension of keeping the act secret that seem to have the most profound emotional reperrussions I; ~ ote, Protection of Children frorr. Use in
Pornography: Toward Con.~tutional and Enforceable Legislation. 12 J.
295, 301 (1979) U. Mich. J. Law Reform (thereafter cit.eel as Use in Pornog·
raphy) (interview with child psychiatrist.) ('"the victims knowledge of publi·
cation of the visual material incre~ the emotional and psychic harm suf·
fered by the child ...).
Thus, distribution of the material violates '"the indhidual interest in
avoiding disclosure of personal matters." Whalen,._ Roe, 429 U.S. 589,
599-600 (197i) (footnotes omitted). Repondents annot undermine the
force of the privacy interests involved here by looking to Ccn Broadc;o.ltit&g
Ccrrp v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 468 (1975) and Smith v. Do.ily Mail Publiah.ing
Co., 443 U. S. 9i (1979), cases protecti'lg the Tight of newspapen to pu~
lish, respectively, the identity of a rape •;ctim and a youth charged as a
juvenile offender. Those cases only stand for the proposition tha: if a
newspaper lawfully obtains truthful information about a matter of public
signi..fica.nce, the state officials may not constitutionally punish publication
of the information absent a need of the highest order."
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controUed. Indeed, there is no senous contention that the
legislature was unjustified in believing that it is difficult, if
not impossible, to halt the exploitation of children by pursuing only those who produce the photographs and movies.
While the production of pornographic materials is a low-profile. clandestine industry, the need to market the resulting
products requires a visible apparatus of distribution. The
most expeditious if not the only practical method of law enforcement may be to dry up the market for this material by
im~sing severe criminal penalties on persons selling, advertising, or otherwise promoting the product. Thirty-five
States and Congress have concluded that restraints on the
distribution of pornographic materials are required in order
to effectively combat the problem, and there is a body of literature and testimony to support these legislative conclusions.11 Cf. United St.ates v. Darby, 312 U. S. 100 (1941)
(upholding federal restrictions on sale of goods manufactured
in violation of Fair Labor Standards Act).
Respondent does not contend that the State is unjustified
in pursuing those who distribute child pornography.
Rather, he argues that it is enough for the State to prohibit
the distribution of materials that are legally obscene under
the Miller test. While some States may find that this approach properly accommodates its interests, it does not follow that that the First Amendment prohibits a State from going further. The Miller standard, like all general definitions
of what may be banned as obscene, does not reflect the
State's particular and more compelling interest in prosecuting those who promote the sexual exploitation of children.
Thus, the question under the Miller test of whether a work,
taken as a whole, appeals to the prurient interest of the average person bears no connection to the issue of whether a child
has been physically or psychologically harmed in the production of the work. Similarly, a sexually explicit depiction
need not be "patently offensive" in order to have required the
sexual exploitation of a child for its production. In addition,
a work which, taken on the whole, contains serious literary,
artistic, political, or scientific value may nevertheless embody the hardest core of child pornography. "It is irrelevant
to the child [who has been abused) whether or not the material . . . has a literary, artistic, political, or social value."
Memorandum of Assemblyman Lasher in Support of§ 263.15.
We therefore cannot conclude that the Miller standard is a
satisfactory solution to the child pornography problem. 11
11

See Sexual Exploitation of Children. Hea."1n2S before the Subcommit-

tee to I vestigate Juvenile Delinquency of the House Judiciary Comm., 95th

Cong .. 1st Sess., 34 (1977) (statement of Charles Rembar) ("'It is an impossible prosecutorial job to try to get at the acts themselves."); id., at 11
(statement of Frank Osanka. Professor of Social Justice and Sociology)
(w[W)e have to be very careful ... that we don't take comfort in the existence of statutes that are on the books in the connection with the use of
children in pornography . . . There are usually no witnesses to these acts
of producing pornography."); id., at 69 (statement of Investigator Lloyd
~fartin. Los Angeles Police department) (producers of child pornography
use false names making clifficult the tracing of mat.eria.l back from distributor). See al.so L. Tribe, American Constitutional Law, 666, n. 62 (1978);
Pope, Child Pornography: A New Role for the Obscenity Doctrine, 1978 U.
Ill. L. Forum, 711, 716, n. 29; Note, Use in Pornography at 315 ("passage
of erim.inal laws aimed at producers without similar regulation of distributors will arguably shift the production process further underground.").
u In addition. legal obscenity under M i1ler is a function of "contemporary
community standards." 413 U.S., at 24. "It is neither realistic nor constitutionally sound to read the First Amendment as reqWring that the people of Maine or M.issippi accept public depiction of conduct found tolerable
in Las Vegas or New York City." Id., at 32. It would be equally unrealistic to equate a community's toleration for sexually oriented material
~ith the permissible scope of legislation aimed at protecting children from
sexuaJ exploitation. Furthermore, a number of States rely on stricter ob-

Third. The advertising and selling of child pornography
provides an economic motive for and is thus an integral part
of the production of such materials, an activity illegal
throughout the nation. u "It rarely has been suggested that
the constitutional freedom for speech and press extends its
immunity to speech or writing used as an integral part of conduct in violation of a valid criminal statute." Giboney v. Em-pire Storage & lee Co., 336 U. S. 490, 498 (1949). 14 We note
that were the statutes outlawing the employment of children
in these films and photographs fully effective, and the con·
stitutionality of these laws have not been questioned, the
First Amendment implications would be no greater than that
presented by laws against distribution: enforceable produc·
tion laws would leave no child pornography to be marketed. 1 ~
Fourth. The value of permitting live performances and
photographic reproductions of children engaged in lewd sex·
ual conduct is exceedingly modest, if not de minimis. We
consider it unlikely that visual depictions of children performing sexual acts or lewdly exhibiting their genitals would often
constitute an important and necessary part of a literary performance or scientific or educational work. As the trial
court in this case observed, if it were necessary for literary or
artistic value, a person over the statutory age who perhaps
looked younger could be µtilized. 11 Simulation outside of the
prohibition of the statute could provide another alternative.
Nor is there is any question here of censoring a particular literary theme or . portrayal of sexual activity. The First
Amendment interest is limited to that of rendering the portrayal somewhat more "realistic" by utilizing or
photographing children.
Fifth. Recognizing and classifying child pornography as a
category of material outside the protection of the First
Amendment is not incompatible with our earlier decisions.
"The question whether speech is, or is not protected by the
First Amendment often depends on the content of the
speech." Young v. American Mini Theatres, 427 U. S. 50,
66 (Opinion of JUSTICE STEVENS, joined by THE CHIEF Jus.
TICE, JUSTICE WHITE, and JUSTICE REHNQUIST). See al.so
FCC v. Pacifica Fcru:ndation, 438 U. S. 726, 742-748 (1978)
scenity tests, see note 7 11itpra, under which successful prosecution for
child pornography may be even more difficulL
u One state commision studying the problem declared, "The act of selling
these materials is guaranteeing that there will be additional abuse of clilldren." Texas House Select Comm. on Child Pornography, Its Related
Causes and Control 44 (1978). See also Densen-Gerber, Commercial
Exploitation at 80 ("'Printed materials cannot be isolated or removed from
the process involved in developing them.").
•• In Giboney, a unanimous Court held that labor unions eould be restrallied from. picketing a firm in support of a secondary boycott which a
State had validly ouiliiwed. In Pittsburgh Pre3s Co. v. PittBburgh
Comm'n on Human Relations, 413 U. S. 376 (1973), the Court allowed an
injunction against a newspaper's furtherance of illegal sex discrimination
by placing of job advertisements in gender-designated columns. The
Court stated:
"Any First Amendment interest which might be sen'ed by advertising an
ordinary commercial proposal and which might arguably outweigh the government interest supporting the regulation is altogether absent when the
commercial activity is illegal and the restriction on advertising is incidental
to a valid limitation on economic activity." Id. at 389.
.. In this connection we note that 18 U. S.C § 2251 (1979 Supp.), making
it a federal offense for anyone to use children under the age of 16 in the
production of pornographic materials, embraces all "sexually explicit conduct" without imposing an obscenity test. ln addition, half of the state
laws imposing criminal liability on the producer do not require the '"isu.al
mat.erial to be legally obscene. Note, Use in Pornography, at 307-308
(1979).

"96 Misc. 2d at 676, 409 N.Y.S. 2.d at 637. This is not merely a hyper
thetical possibility. See Brief for Petitioner at 25 and examples cited

therein.
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(Opinion of JUSTICE STEVENS, joined by THE CHIEF JUSTICE, JUSTICE WHITE, and JUSTICE REHNQUIST). "It is the
content of an utterance that detenr.ines whether it is a protected epithet or an unprotected 'fighting comment.'"
Young v. American Mini Theatres, supra, at 66. See
Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U. S. 568 (1942).
Leaving aside the special considerations when public officials
are the target, New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U. S. 254
(1964), a libelous public.ation is not protected by the Constitution. Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U. S. 250 (1952). Thus,
it is not rare that a content-based classific.ation of speech has
been accepted because it may be appropriately generalized
that within the confines of the given classific.ation, the evil to
be restricted so overwhelmingly outweighs the expressive interests, if any, at stake, that no process of case-by-case adjudic.ation is required. When a definable class of material,
such as that covered by § 263.15, bears so heavily and pervasively on the welfare of children engaged in its production,
we think the balance of competing interests is clearly struck
and that it is permissible to consider these materials as without the protection of the First Amendment.

c
There are, of course, limits on the category of child pornography which, like obscenity, is unprotected by the First
Amendment. AB with all legislation in this sensitive area,
the conduct to be prohibited must be adequately defined by
the applicable state law, a.s written or authoritatively construed. Here the nature of the harm to be combatted requires that the state offense be limited to works that visu.ally
depict sexual conduct by children below a specified age. 17
The category of ..sexual conduct" proscribed must also be
suitably limited and described.
The test for child pornography is separate from the obscenity standard enunciated in Miller, but may be compared to it
for purpose of clarity. The Miller formulation is adjusted in
the following respects: A trier of fact need not find th.at the
material appeals to the prurient interest of the average person; it is not required that sexual conduct portrayed be done
so in a patently offensive manner; and the material at issue
need not be considered as a whole. We note that the distribution of descriptions or other depictions of sexual conduct,
not otherwise obscene, which do not involve live performance
or photographic or other visual reproduction of live performances, retains First Amendment protection. AJ3 with obscenity laws, criminal responsibility may not be imposed
\\ithout some element of scienter on the part of the defendant. Smith v. Cal~fornia, 361 U. S. 147 (1959); Hamling v.
United States, 418 U. S. 87 (1974).
D
Section 263.15's prohibition incorporates a defuljtion of
sexual conduct that comports v.ith the above-stated princip!es. The forbidden acts to be depicted are listed with sufficient precision and represent the kind of conduct that, if it
were the theme of a work, could render it legally obscene:

7
' Sixteen States define a child as a person unde:r age 18.
Four States
define a child as under 17 years old. The federal law and 16 States, includ·
ing New Yo:rk, define a child as under 16. Illinois and Nebraska define
define a child as a person under age 16 or who appean as a prepubes.cent.
Ill. Ann. Stat. ch. 38 § ll-20a (1978); Neb. Rev. Stat. § 28-1463 (Supp.
1S78). Indiana defines a child as one who is or appears to be under 16.
Ind. Code. §§ 3&-30-10.1-2 to 3 (Supp. 1978). Kentucky provides for two
age classifications (16 and 18) and varies punishment according to the vie.
ti..'Tl'e age. Ky. Rev. Stat.§§ 531.300-.370 rSupp. 1978). See Note, Use in
Pornography, at 307, n. 71 (collecting statutes).

"actual o:~ -~~
;:;;:"~...:~ ~~=;;;;;;, .;;;;; ~ ........... ~,.I.MU rntercourse, sexual bestiality, masturbation, sadomasochistic
abuse, or lewd ex.hlbition of the genitals." § 263.3. The
term "lewd exhibition of the genitals" is not unlmown in this
area and, indeed, was given in Miller as an example of a permissible regulation. 413 U. S., at 25. A performance is defined only to include live or visual depictions: "any play, motion picture, photograph or dance . . . or other \-isual
representation before an audience." § 263.4. Section 263.15
expressly includes a scienter agreement.
We hold that § 263.15 sufficiently describes a category of
material the production and distribution of which is not entitled to First Amendment protection. It is therefore clear
that there is nothing .unconstitutionally "underinclusive"
about a statute that singles out this c.ategory of material for
proscription. u It also follows that the State is not ban-ed by
the First Amendment from prohibiting the distribution of unprotected materials produced outside the State. .,

III

It remains to address the claim that the New York statute
is unconstitutionally overbroad because it would forbid the
distribution of material with serious literary, scientific or
educ.ational value or material which does not threaten the
hanns sought to be combatted by the State. Respondent
prevailed on that ground below, and it is to that issue that we
now turn.
The New York Court of Appeals recognized that
overbreadth scrutiny has been limited with respect to con·
duct-related regulation, Broadrick v. Okla.lwma, 413 U. S.
601 (1973), but it did not apply the test enunciated in
Broadrick because the challenged statute, in its view, was directed at "pure speech." The court went on to find that
§ 263.15 was fatally overbroad: "[T]he statute would prohibit
the showing of any play or movie in which a child portrays a
defined sexual act, real or simulated, in a nonobscene manner. It would also prohibit the sale, showing, or distributing
of medical or educational materials containing photographs of
such acts. Indeed, by its terms, the statute would prohibit
those who oppose such portrayals from providing illustrations of what they oppose." 52 N. Y. 2d, at 678, 422 N. E. 2d,
at 525.
While the construction that a state court gives a state statute is not a matter subject to our review, Wainright v. Sterne,
414 U. S. 21, ZZ-23 (1973); Gooding v. Wilson, 405 U.S. 518,
520 (1972), this Court is the final arbiter of whether the federal constitution necessitated the invalidation of a state law.
11
E1'%'111:1ntik v. City of Jackacmville, 422 U. S. 205 (1975), relied upon by
the Court of Appeals, struck down a law a.g&i.nst drive-in theaters showing
nude scenes if movie! eould be seen fl-om a public place. Since nudity.
without more is protected expression. id .. at 213. we proceeded to co!l5ider
the underi.nclusivene!! of the ordinance. The Jackson\'ille ordir.ance impennissibly singled out movies with nudlty fo:r special treatment "l\·hile fail·
ing to regulate other protected speech which created the same alleged risk
to traffic. Today, we hold that child pornography as defined in§ 263.15 is
unprotected speech subject to content-based regulation. Hence, it cannot
be underinclusive or unconstitutional for a State to do precisely that..
••It is often impoeaible to determine wheJ"t> such material is produced.
The Senate Report ..ccompanying federal child pornognphy legislation
stJ"es&ed tha.t "it is quite common for photographs or films made in the
United States to be sent to foreign eountries to be reproduced and then
returned to this eountry in order to give the impression of foreign origin."
S. Rep. No. 95-438, p. 6 (1978). In addltion, State! have not limited their
distribution laW8 to mat.erial produced \\ithin their own borders because
the ma.int.enanct' of the market it.self "leaves open the financ:W conduit by
which the product.ion of such material is funded and mat.erially increases
the risk t.h&t [local) children will be injured." 52 N.Y. 2d at 688; 422 N.E.
2d at 531 (Judge Juan, dissenting).
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lt 15 oruy infuugri ~m.s J:llvG::55 v:i: ·1~·Vli;;'w' wl.4·.:. ·.,.;;; 1u.ay co?Tect
erroneous applications of the Constitution that err on the side
of an overly broad reading of our doctrines and precedents,
as well as state court decisions giving the Constitution too little shrift. A state court is not free to avoid a proper facial
attack on federal constitutional grounds. Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U. S. 809, 817 (1975). By the same token, it
should not be compelled to entertain an overbreadth attack
when not req'Wred to do so by the Constitution.

"

A

The traditional ru1e is that a person to whom a statute may
constitutionally be applied may not challenge that statute on
the ground that it may conceivably be applied unconstitutionallv to others in situations not before the Court. Broadrick
v. Oklahoma, 413 U. S., at 610; United States v. Raines, 362
U. S. 17, 21 (1960); Carmichael v. Southern Coal & Coke
Co., 301 U.S. 495, 513 (1937); Yazoo & M. V. R. Co. v. Jackson Vinegar Co., 226 U. S. 217, 21S-220 (1912). In
Broadrick, we recognized that this rule reflect two cardinal
principles of our constitutional order. the personal nature of
constitutional rights, McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U. S. 420,
429 (1961), and prudential limitations on constitutional adjudication. 20 In United States v. Raines, supra, at 21, we
noted the "incontrovertible proposition'' that it "would indeed
be undesirable for this Court to consider every conceivable
situation which might possibly arise in the application of complex and comprehensive legislation," (quoting Barrows v.
Jackson, 346 U. S. 249, 256 (1953)). By focusing on the factual situation before us, and similar cases necessary for
development of a constitutional rule, Zl we face ''fiesh-andblood" zz legal problems with data "relevant and adequate to
an informed judgment.":1 This practice also fulfills a valuable institutional purpose: it allows state courts the opportunitv to construe a law to avoid constitutional infirmities.
What has come to be known as the First Amendment
overbreadth doctrine is one of the few exceptions to this principle and must be justified by "weighty countervailing policies." United States v. Raines, supra at 22-23. The doc.trine is predicated on the sensitive nature of protected
expression: ."persons whose expression is constitutionally
protected may well refrain from exercising their rights for
fear of criminal sanctions by a statute susceptible of application to protected expression." Village of Schaumburg v.
Citizens fora Better Envi:ronment, 444 U. S. 620, 634 (1980);
Gooding v. Wilson, 405 U. S. 518, 521 (1972). It is for this

" In addition to prudential restraints, the traditional rule is grounded in
Article III limits on the jurisdiction of federal courts to actual cases and
controversies.
"This Court. a.s is the case with all federal courts. 'has no jurisdiction to
pronounce any statute, either of a State or of the United States. void. because irreconcilable v.ith the Constitution, except as it is called upon to adjudge the legal rights of litigants in actual controversies. In the exerci.'"€
of that ju..'is<liction, it is bound by two rules to which it has rigidly adhered,
one. never to anticipate a question of constitutional law in advance of the
necessity of deciding it; the other never to formulate a rule of constitutional
law broader than is required by the precise facts to which it is applied.'
Liverpool, New York & Philadelphia S.S. Co. v. Commissioners of Emi9'J'Cltion, 113 U. S. 33, 39." United Stai& v. Raina, 362 U. S. 17, 21
(1960).

=Overbreadth challenges are only one type of facial attack. A person
whose acti\iry may be constitutionally regulated nevertheless may argue
that the statute under which he is convicted or regulat.ed is invalid on its
face. See, e.g. Terrninello v. City of Chicago, 337 U.S. l, 5 (1949). See
generally lionaghan, Overbreadth, 1981 Sup. Ct. Review l, 10-14..
z: A. Bickel. The Least Dangerous Branch 115-116 (1962);
zi Frankfurt.er & Han, The Business of the Supreme Court at October
Term 1934. 49 Harv. L. Rev. 68. 95-96 0935).

reason that we have allowed persons to attack overly broad
statutes even though the conduct of the person making the
attack is clearly unprotected and could be proscribed by a law
drawn with the requsite specificity. Dombrowski v. Pfister,
380 U. S. 479, 486 (1965); Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U. S.
88, 97-98 (1940); United States v. Raines, supra at 21-22;
Gooding v. Wilson, supra, at 521.
The scope of the First Amendment overbreadth doctrine,
like most exceptions to established principles, must be carefully tied to the circumstances in which facial invalidation of a
statute is truly warranted. Because _of the wide.reaching effects of striking a statute down on its face at the request of
one whose own conduct may be punished despite the First
Amendment, we have recognized that the overbreadth doctrine is "strong medicine" and have employed it with hesitation, and then "only as a last resort." Broadrick, 413 U. S.,
at 613.
We have, in consequence, insisted that the
overbreadth involved be "substantial" before the statute involved will be invalidated on its face.,.
In Broadrick, we explained the basis for this requirement:
[T]he plain import of our cases is, at the very least, that
facial overbreadth adjudication is the exception to our
traditional rules of practice and that its function, a limited one at the outset, attenuates as the otherwise protected behavior that it forbids the State to sanction
moves from ''pure speech" toward conduct and that conduct-even if expressive-falls 'Within the scope of otherwise valid criminal laws that reflect legitimate state interests in maintaining comprehensive controls over
harmful, constitutionally unprotected conduct.
.Although such laws, if too broadly worded, may deter protected speech to some unknown extent, there comes a
point where that effect-at best a prediction-eannot,
with confidence, justify invalidating a statute on its face
and so prohibiting a State from enforcing the statute
against conduct that is admittedly within its power to
proscribe. Cf. Alderman v. United States, 394 U. S.
165, 174-175 (1969)." 413 U.S., at 615.
We accordingly held that ''particularly where conduct and not
merely speech is involved, we believe that the overbreadth of
a statute must not only be real, but substantial as well,
judged in relation to the statute's plainly legitimate sweep."

lbid. 25
,. When a federal court is dealing with a federal statute challenged as
overbroad, it should, of course, construe the statute to avoid constitutional
problems, if the statute is subject to such a limiting construction. Crowell
v. Bem<11t, 285 U.S. 22, 62 (1932). Accord, e. g., Hayn.es v. United
States, 390 U. S. 85. 92 (1968) (dictum); Schnieder v. Smith. 390 U.S. li,
'li (1968); United States v. Rumely, 345 U. S. 41, 45 (1953): Ash.wander v.
Tennessee Valleu Autharity, 297 U.S. 288, 348 (1936) CBrandeis, J. concurring). Furthermore, if the federal statute iE not subject to a na..'TOwing
construction and is imperrnissibly overbroad, it nevertheless should not be
stricken down on its face; if it i.s severable, only the unconstitutional portion is to be invalidated. Un.ited St.a.tu v. Thirty-Seven Photographs, 402
u. s. 363 (1971).
A state court is also free to deal with a state statute in the same way. If
the invalid reach of the law is cured, there is no longer reason for proscribing the statute's application to unprotect.ed conduct. Here, of course, we
are dealing with a state statute on direct review of a state court decision
that bas constr11ed the statute. Such a construction is binding on us.
-:> Parke-r v. Levy, 41i U. S. 733, 760 (1974) ("This Court bas ... repeatedly expressed its reluctance to strike down a statute on its face where
there• were a substantial number of situations to which it might be validly
applied. Thus, even if there are m.art..nal applications in which a statute
would infr.nge on First Amendment values. facial invalidation ii: inappropriate if the 'remainder of the statute . . . covers a whole range of easily
identifiable and constitutionally proscribable conduct . . . conduct ... '

CSC v. Letter Carri.en, 413 U.S. 548, 580-581 (1973).').

See Bogen,
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Broadrick was a regulation involving restrictions on political campaign activity, an area not considered "pure speech,"
and thus it was unnecessary to consider the proper
overbreadth test when a law arguably reaches traditional
forms of expression such as books and films. As we intimated in Broadrick, the requirement of substantial
overbreadth extended "at the very least" to cases involving
conduct plus speech. This case, which poses the question
squarely, convinces us that the rationale of Broadrick is
sound and should be applied in the present context involving
the harmful employment of children to make sexually explicit
materials for distribution.
The premise that a law should not be invalidated for
overbreadth unless it reaches a substantial number of impermissible applications is hardly novel. On most occasions involving facial invalidation, the Court has stressed the embracing sweep of the statute over protected expression.•
Indeed, JUSTICE BRENNAN observed in his dissenting opinion in Broadrick:
'We have never held that a statute should be held invalid
on its face merely because it is possible to conceive of a
single impermissible application, and in that sense a requirement of substantial overbreadtb is already implicit
in the doctrine." 413 U. S., at 630.
The requirement of substantial overbreadtb is directly derived from the purpose and nature of the doctrine. While a
sweeping statute, or one incapable of limitation, has the potential to repeatedly chill the exercise of expressive activity
by many indh;duals, the extent of deterrence of protected
speech can be expected to decrease with the declining reach
of the regulation. r. This observation appears equally applicable to the publication of books and films as it is to activities,
such as picketing or participation in election campaigns,
which have previously been categorized as involving conduct
plus speech. We see no appreciable difference between the
position of a publisher or bookseller in doubt as to the reach

First Amendment Ancillary Doctr.nes, 4 Maryland L. Rev. 679, il2-714
(1978); Note, First Amendment Overbreadth Doctrine, 83 Harv. L. Rev.
844, 860-861 (1970).
•In Good.i7UJ v. WiUon, 405 U. S. 518, 527 (1972), the Court's invalida·
tion of a Georgia statute making it a misdemeanor to use "opprobrious
words or abusive language tending to cauae a breach of the peace" followed
from state judicial decisions indicating that "merely to speak words offensive to some who hear them" could constitute a "breach of the peace."
Cases invalidating laws requiring members of a "subversive organiz.ation"
to take a loyalty oath, Baggett v. Bullitt., 377 U. S. 360 (1964), or register
with the government, Domlrrowski v. Pfiater, 380 U. S. 479 (1965), can be
explained on the basis that the laws involved, unlike § 263.15, defined no
central core of constitutionally regulable conduct; the en~ scope of the
laws was subject to the uncertainties and vagaries of prosecutori.a.J discretion. See al&o Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U. S. 809, 817 (1975) ("the fact of
this case well illustrate 'the statute's potential for sweeping and improper
applications."') (citation omitted); NAACP v. Button, 371 U. S. 415, 433
(1963) ("We read the decree of the Virginia Supreme Court of Appea.18 ...
a.E proscribing any arrangement by which prospective litigants are advised
to seek the assistance of particular attorneys."); Th.om.kill v. Alabama,
310 U. S. 88, 9"l (1940) (the statute "does not aim specifically at evil! within
the allowable are.a of state control but, on the contrary, sweeps within its
ambit other activities that in ordinary cireumst.a.nces constitute an exerciae
of freedom of speech or of the press.").
""A substantial overbreadth ru.le is implicit in the chilling effect ration·
ale ... the presumption must be that only substantially overbroad laws set
up the kind and degree of ch.ill that is judicially cogniz.a.ble."' Moreover,
··without a substantial overbreadth limitation, re'-iew for overbreadth
would be draconian indeed. It is difficult to think of a law that is utterly
devoid of potent:i&l for unconstitutionality in some conceivabie application."
Note, first Amendment Overbreadth Doctrine, 83 Harv. L. Rev., at 859
and n. 61.

of New .1. u111. ::s clll.lu pornograpny i.aw ana tne situation face<
by the Oklahoma state employees with respect to that state'i
rest..'"iction on partisan politiCAI activity. Indeed, it couJc
reasonably be argued that the bookseller, with an economic
incentive to sell materials that may fall within the statute's
scope, may be less likely to be deterred than the employee
who wishes to engage in political campaign activity. er.
Bates v. State Bar of Arizona, 433 U. S. 350, 38()..381 (1977)
(overbreadtb analysis inapplicable to commercial speech).
This requirement of substantial overbreadtb may justifi.
ably be applied to statutory challenges which arise in defense
of a criminal prosecution as well as civil enforcement or actions seeking a declaratory judgment. Cf. Parker v. Levy,
417 U. S. 733, 760 (1974). Indeed, the Court's practice when
confronted with ordinary eriminal laws that are sought to be
applied against protected conduct is not to invalidate the law
in t.ot.o, but rather to reverse the particular conviction.
Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U. S. 296 (1940); Edwards v.
South Carolina, 372 U. S. 229 (1973). We recognize, however, that the penalty to be imposed is relevant in determining whether demonstrable overbreadth is substantial. We
simply hold that the fact that a criminal prohibition is involved does not obviate the need for the inquiry or a priori
warrant a finding of substantial overbreadth.

B
Applying these principles, § 263.15 is not substantially
overbroad. We consider this the paradigmatic case of a
state statute whose legitimate reach dwarfs its arguably im·
permissible applications. New York, as we have held, may
constitutionally prohibit dissemination of material specified
in § 263.15. 'While the reach of the statute is directed at the
hard core of child pornography, the Court of Appeals was understandably concerned that some protected expression,
ranging from medical textbooks to pictorials in National Geographic would fall prey to the statute. How often, if ever, it
may be necessary to employ children to engage in conduct
clearly within the reach of the § 263.15 in order to produce
educational, medical or artistic works cannot be known with
certainty. Yet we seriously doubt, and it has not been suggested, that these arguably impermissible applications of the
statute amount to more than a tiny fraction of the materials
within the statute's reach. Nor will we assume that the
New York courts will widen the possibly invalid reach of the
statute by giving an expansive construction to the proscription on "1ewd exhibitionfsJ of the genitals." Under these cir·
cumstances. § 263.15 is "not substantially overbroad and
whatever o~erbreadth exists should be cured through c.aseby-case analysis of the fact situations to which its sanctions,
assertedly, may not be applied." Broadrick v. Oklalwrrw.,
413 U. S .. at 615-616.

IV
Because § 263.15 i.s not substantially overbroad, it is wmec·
essary to consider its application to material that does not depict sexual conduct of a type that New York may restrict con·
sistent with the First Amendment. As applied to Paul
Ferber and to others who distribute similar material, the
statute does not violate the First Amendment as applied to
the States through the Fourteenth. 211
The decision of the

" There iB no argument that the films sold by respondent do not fall
squarely within the category of act.hi~· we have defined as unprot.Kted.
Therefore. no independent examination of the materilJ i!! nec"t'!SS.."Y to Bl""
sure ourselves that the jud~ent here ..does not constitute a forbidden intrusion on the field of free expression." New York Timu \'. Sullii'lln, 376

u. s. 2.54, 285 (1964).
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New York Court of Appeals is reversed and the case is remanded to that Court for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.
So ardemi.
JUSTICE Bl..ACKMUN concurs in the result.

Ju~TICE

O'CONNOR, concurring.
Although I join the Court's opinion, I write separately to
stress that the Court does not hold that New York must except "material ·with serious literary, scientific or educational
value," ante, at 19, from its statute. The Court merely holds
that, even if the First Amendment shelters such material,
New York's current statute is not sufficiently overbroad to
support respondent's facial attack. The compelling interests
identified in today's opinion, see ante, at 9-16, suggest that
the Constitution might in fact permit New York to ban knowing distribution of works depicting minors engaged in explicit
sexual conduct, regardless of the social value of the depictions. For example, a 12-year-old child photographed while
masturbating surely suffers the same psychological harm
whether the community labels the photograph "edifying" or
"tasteless." The audience's appreciation of the depiction is
simply irrelevant to New York's asserted interest in protecting children from psychological, emotional, and mental harm.
An exception for depictions of serious social value, moreover, would actually increase opportunities for the contentbased censorship disfavored by the First Amendment. As
drafted, New York's statute does not attempt to suppress
the communication of particular ideas. The statute permits
discussion of child sexuality, forbidding only attempts to render the "portrayal[s] somewhat more 'realistic' by utilizing or
photographing children." Ante, at 15. Thus, the statute attempts to protect minors from abuse without attempting to
restrict the expression of ideas by those who might use children as live models.
On the other hand, it is quite possible that New York's
statute is overbroad because it bans depictions that do not actuallv threaten the harms identified by the Court. For exampie, clinical pictures of adolescent sexuality, such as those
that might appear in medical textbooks, might not involve
the type of sexual exploitation and abuse targeted by New
York's statute. Nor might such depictions feed the poisonous "kiddie porn" market that New York and other States
have attempted to regulate. Similarly, pictures of children
engaged in rites ~;dely approved by their cultures, such ~
those that might appear in issues of National Geographic,
might not trigger the compelling interests identified by the
Court. It is not necessary to address these possibilities further today, however, because this potential overbreadth is
not sufficiently substantial to warrant facial invalidation of
New Y ark's statute.

JUSTICE BRENNAN, with whom JUSTICE MARSHALL joins,
concuning in the judgment.
I agree with much of what is said in the Court's opinion.
A1' I ma.de clear in the opinion I delivered for the Court in
Ginslm:rg v. New York, 390 U. S. 629 (1968), the State has a
special interest in prot~g the well-being of its youth.
Id., at 638-641. See also Globe Newspapers v. Superior
Court, U. S. - , (1982) (slip. op. at 11). This
special and compelling interest, and the particular vulnerability of c..iUldren, afford the State the leeway to regulate porncr
graphic material, the promotion of which is harmful to children, even though the State does not have such leeway when

it seeks only to protect consenting adults from exposure to
such material. Gimburg v. New York, supra, at 637, 638
n. 6, 642-643, n. 10. See also Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U. S.
184, 195 (1964) (opinion of BRENNAN, J .). I also agree with
the Court that the "tiny fraction", ante, at 25, of material of
serious artistic, scientific or educational value that could conceivably fall within the reach of the statute is insufficient to
justify striking the statute on the grounds of overbreadth.
See Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U. S. 601, 630 (1973)
(BRENNAN, J., dissenting).
But in my view application of § ~.15 or any similar statute to depictions of children that in themselves do have serious literary, artistic, scientific or medical value, would violate the First Amendment. As the Court recogniz.es, the
limited classes of speech, the suppression of which does not
raise serious First Amendment concerns, have two attributes. They are of exceedingly "slight social value," and
the State has a compelling interest in their regulation. See
Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U. S. 568, 571-572
(1942). The First Amendment value of depictions of children
that are in themselves serious contributions to art, literature
or science, is, by definition, simply not "de minimis." See
ante, at 14. At the same time, the State's interest in suppression of such materials is likely to be far less compelling.
For the Court's assumption of harm to the child resulting
from the "permanent record" and "circulation" of the child's
"participation," ante, at 10, lacks much of its force where the
depiction is a serious contribution to art or science. The production of materials of serious value is not the "low-profile
clandestine industry" that according to the Court produces
purely pornogrphic materials. See ante, at 11. In short, it
is inconceivable how a depiction of a child that is itself a serious contribution to the world of art or literature or science
can be deemed "material outside the protection of the First
Amendment." See a:nte, at 15.
I, of course, adhere to my view that, in the absence of exposure, or particular harm, to juveniles or unconsenting
adults the State lacks power to suppress sexually oriented
materials. See, e. g., Paris Adult Theatre Iv. Slaton, 413
u. s. 49, 73 (1973) (BRENNAN, J., dissenting). With this understanding, I concur in the Court's judgment in this case.

JUSTICE STEVENS, concurring in the judgment.

Two propositions seem perfectly clear to me. First, the
specific conduct that gave rise to this criminal prosecution is
not protected by the Federal Constitution; second, the state
statute that respondent violated prohibits some conduct that
is protected by the First Amendment. The critical question,
then, is whether this respondent, to whom the statute may
be applied without. violating the Constitution, may challenge
the statute on the ground that it conceivably may be applied
unconstitutionally to others in situations not before the
Court. I agree with the Court's answer to this question but
not with its method of analyzing the issue.
Before addressing that issue, I shall explain why respondent's conviction d0es not violate the Constitution. The two
films that respondent sold contained nothing more than lewd
exhibition; there is no claim that the films included any material that had literary, artistic, scientific, or educational
value. 1 Respondent was a willing participant in a commer-

1 Respondent's couruoel conceded at oral argument tha.t a finding that the
films are obscene would have been coMistent with the Miller definition.
Tr. of Oral Arg. 41.

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

31 CrL 3147

cial market that the State of New York has a legitimate interest in suppressing. The character of the State's interest in
protecting children from sexual abuse justifies the imposition
of criminal sanctions against those who profit, directly or indirectly, from the promotion of such films. In this respect
my evaluation of this case is different from the opinion I have
expressed concerning the imposition of criminal sanctions for
the promotion of obscenity in other contexts. 2
A holding that respondent may be punished for selling
these two films does not require us to conclude that other
users of these very films, or that other motion pictures containing similar scenes, are beyond the pale of constitutional
protection. Thus, the exhibition of these films before a legislative committee studying a proposed amendment to a state
law, or before a group of research scientists studying human
behavior, could not. in my opinion, be made a crime. Moreover, it is at least concei\·able that a serious work of a.rt, a
documentary on behavioral problems, or a medical or psychiatric teaching device, might include a scene from one of these
films and. when viewed as a whole in a proper setting, be entitled to constitutional protection. The question whether a
specific act of communication is protected by the First
Amendment alwars requires some consideration of both its
content and its context.
The Court's holding that this respondent may not challenge
New York's statute as overbroad follows its discussion of the
contours- of the category of nonobscene child pornography
that ~ew York may legitimately prohibit. Ha\'ing defined
that category in an abstract setting,'1 the Court makes the
empirical judgment that the arguably impermissible application of the New York statute amounts to only a "tiny fraction
of the materials within the statute's reach." Ante, at 25.
Even assuming that the Court's empirical analysis is sound,'
I believe a more conservative approach to the issue would adequately- vindicate the State's interest in protecting its children and cause less harm to the federal interest in free
expression.
A hypothetical example will illustrate my concern. Assume that the operator of a New York motion picture theater
specializing in the exhibition of foreign feature films is offered a full-length movie containing one scene that is plainly

lewd if viewed in isolation but that nevertheless is part of a
serious work of.art. If the child actor resided abroad, Xew
York's interest in protecting its young from sexual exploitation would be far less compelling than in the case before us.
The federal interest in free expression would, however, be
just as strong as if an ::.d!l!t .actor had been ~~':?d. Thi:>!"<? lli-c
at least three different \\•ays to deal with the statute's pct~~:
tial application to that sort of case.
First, at one extreme and as the Court appears to hold, the
First Amendment inquiry might he limited to determining
whether the offensive scene, viewed in isolation, is lewd.
When the constitutional protection is narrowed in this drastic
fashion, the Court is probably safe in concluding that only a
tiny fraction of the materials covered by the ~ ew York statute is protected. And with respect to my hypothetical exhibitor of foreign films, he need have no uncertainty about
the permissible application of the statute~ for the one lewd
scene would deprive the entire film of any constitutional
protection.
Second, at the other extreme and as the New York Court
of Appeals correctly perceived, the application of this Court's
cases requiring that an obscenity determination be based on
the artistic value of a production taken as a whole would afford the exhibitor constitutional proteetion and result in a
holding that the statute is invalid because of its overbreadth.
Under that approach, the rationale for invalidating the entire
statute is premised on the concern that the exhibitor's understanding about its potential reach could cause him to engage
in self censorship. This Court's approach today substitutes
broad, unambiguous state-imposed eensorsrjp for the self
censorship that an overbroad statute might produce.
Third, as an intermediate position, I would refuse to apply
overbreadth analysis for reasons unrelated to any prediction
concerning the relative nwnber of protected communications
that the statute may prohibit. Specifically, I would postpone decision of my hypothetical case until it actually a.-rises.
Advocates of a liberal use of overbreadth analvsis could object to such postponement on the ground that it creates the
risk that the exhibitor's uncertainty may produce self censor·
ship. But that risk obviously interferes less with the interest in free expression than does an abstract, advance ruling
that the film is simply unprotected whenever it contains a
lewd scene no matter how brief.
My reasons for avoiding overbreadth analysis in this case
are more qualitative than quantitatjve. 'When we follow our
traditional practice of adjudicating difficult and novel constitutional questions only in concrete factual situations, the
adjudications tend to be crafted \\ith greater \.\isdom. Hypothetical rulings are inherently tr~acherous and prone to
lead us into unforeseen errors: they are qualitath·ely Jess reliable than the products of case-by-case a.djudication.
Moreover, it is probably safe to assume that the category
of speech that is covered by the :-; ew York statute gener.Jly
is of a lower quality than most other types of communication.
On a number of occasions, I have expressed the view that the
First Amendment affords some forms of speech more protec·
tion from governmental regulation than other forms of
speech.• Today the Court accepts this view, putting the cat·
I

zsee Burck v. Lou:isia.na, 441 u. s. 130, 139 (STEVENS, J., concurring);
Pinkus v. United States, 436 U. S. 293, 305 (STEVENS, J., concurring);
Ballew v. Georgia, 435 U. S. 223, 245 (STEVENS, J., concurring); Smith v.
Fnited States, 431 U. S. 291, 311-321 (STEVENS, J., dissenting); Marks v.
United States, 430 U. S. 188, 198 (STEVENS, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); Stt also Schad v. Borough of Mount Ephraim, 452 U. S.
61, 84 <STEVENS, J., concurring in the judgment); FCC v. Pacifica Foundaticm, 4-38 U. S. 726, 750 (Opinion of STEVENS, J.).
'"The test for child pornography is separate from the obscenity standard enu.Iiciated in Jf ille-r, but may be compared to it for pu..'"'pose of clarity.
The .Willer fonnuiation is adjusted in the following respects: A trier of fact
need not find that the material appeals to the prurient interest of the average person; it is not required that sexual conduct portrayed be done so in a
patently offensive manner: and the material at issue need not be considered
as a whole." A nle. at 16.
'The Court's analysis is di.reC'ted entirely at the permissibility of the
statute's coverage of nonobscene material. Its empirical e\-idence, however, is drawn substantia.lly from congressional committ~ reports that ultimately reached the conclusion that a prohibition against obacene child
pornography-coupled with sufficiently stiff sanctions-is an adequate response to this social problem. The Senate Committee on the Judiciary
concluded that "''irtuallv all of the materials tha.t art' norma.1.lY considered
child pornography are obscene under the current standards,., ~d tha.t "[i)n
comparison with this blatant pornography, non-obscene materials that depict children are very few and very inconsequential." S. Rep. No. 438,
95th Cong., 1st Sess., 13 (1977); see also H.R. Rep. No. 696, 95th Cong.,
1st Sess., 7~ (1977). The coverage of the federal statute is limited to obscene material See 18 U. S. C. § Z252(a).

~See. e. g .. Sch.ad \'. Borough of .lfo11nt Erihraim. supra. at 80. 83

J .. concurring in the judgment!; C~nsolidated .Edison Co. \'.
Public Seri.i.ce Comm·n, ~i l'. S. 530, ~ iSTEVEXS. J., eoncurring
in the judgment); FCC v. Pc.c-ifica Foundation, supro, at 7+;.-i4S (Opinion
of STEV!:ss, J.); Ca~ v. Pop-ulaticm Sm.ices Jn.terno.tior;a!. 431 t:. S.
678, 716-717 (STEVENS, J ., concurring in pan and concurr.ng in the judgment); Smith v. United State.!, supra, at 317-319 (STEVENS, J .. dissent·
ing); You?lg v. American Mini Theatre8. Inc., 427 U.S. 50, 66-71 (Opinion
o( STEVENS, J.).

(STE\'ENS.

31 Crl 3148
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

6-30-82

egory Ot

speecn aescnoea ID t.ne I'iew l on,; Statute in ita
rightful place near the bottom of this hierarchy. Ante, at
14-15. Although I disagree with the Court's position that
such speech i.s totally ~"ithout First Amendment protection, I
agree that generally marginal s~h does not warrant the
extraordinary protection afforded by the overbreadth
doctrine.•
Because I have no difficulty with the statute's application
in this case, I concur in the Court's judgmenL
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